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 ENVIRONMENTAL PRIVACY 
 
Katrina Fischer Kuh* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers and scholars recognize that individuals are an important source 
of environmental harm.1 Individuals’ decisions and actions—running a washing 
machine, driving to work, or purchasing a pair of blue jeans2—impose direct and 
* © 2015 Katrina Fischer Kuh. Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at 
Hofstra University. I am indebted to the Wallace Stegner Center at the University of Utah 
S.J. Quinney College of Law for providing me with the opportunity to present this paper as 
the 2013 Young Scholar Lecture. The project was also supported by a generous research 
grant funded by the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and by the hard 
work of research assistants Sarah Heba, Adam Preller, and Frank Piccininni. 
1 See, e.g., JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW NATURE & 
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 142–43 (2011) (detailing the environmental impacts of everyday 
behaviors); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 183–96 (2008) (observing that “[i]n the United 
States, national emissions limitations imposed on major pollution sources have been the rule, 
not the exception”; criticizing this command-and-control regime; and suggesting strategies 
for achieving voluntary changes in individual behavior, for example, by providing feedback 
and information); Nathan Ostrander, Consumer Liability for Harms Linked to Purchases, 2 
ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 111, 121–23 (2011) (proposing a consumption tort to hold 
individuals accountable for environmental harms); James Salzman, Sustainable 
Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1250, 1255–56 (1997) (explaining the 
connection between consumption and environmental harm); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From 
Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental 
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 537–84 (2004) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to 
SUV] (identifying types of “individual environmentally significant behavior”); Michael P. 
Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10547, 10551–52 (2010) 
[hereinafter Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge] (making 
recommendations to policymakers about how best to achieve reductions in harms from 
environmentally significant individual behaviors); Michael P. Vandenbergh, et al., 
Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716–51 
(2008) [hereinafter Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions] (identifying individual 
greenhouse gas-emitting behaviors most susceptible to change and suggesting strategies for 
changing them); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral 
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1724 (2007) [hereinafter Vandenbergh & Steinemann, 
The Carbon-Neutral Individual] (suggesting that “a mixture of information provision and 
traditional regulatory measures may be needed” to “reduce carbon-emitting behaviors”).  
2 AGENCE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DE LA MAÎTRISE DE L'ENERGIE, AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT DECLARATION OF JEANS, available at http://www.ademe.fr/ 
internet/eco-jean/EPD_en_jeans_v2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/89K6-K7LS (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2014) (providing a life cycle analysis of the environmental impact of 
purchasing and wearing blue jeans, including both indirect impacts embedded in the 
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indirect impacts on the environment that, while often individually de minimis, 
collectively impose significant harms.3 Environmental statutes, however, rarely 
target these environmentally significant individual behaviors; regulatory attention 
focuses primarily on industrial sources of environmental harm.4 And public 
ignorance of the connection between lifestyle and environment is pervasive—there 
is “a cognitive severance of environmental cause and effect”5 that permits 
individuals to “participate in environmental degradations of monumental 
proportions in a completely anonymous and unconscious fashion.”6    
In the context of climate change, for example, greenhouse gas emissions 
attributable to the direct emissions of individuals or households are estimated to 
account for approximately 30% of total U.S. emissions.7 Notably, this estimate 
counts only direct emissions and thus captures primarily greenhouse gas emissions 
generated by private transportation and home energy use.8 Estimates of greenhouse 
gas emissions attributable to individuals are far greater when indirect emissions are 
included. Indirect emissions might result from the preparation (production and 
delivery) of a product or service before its use (such as the emissions generated 
during the manufacture and delivery of a car). One study that adopted a consumer 
lifestyle approach designed to capture both direct and indirect emissions concluded 
that consumer lifestyle decisions account for 85% of all energy use in the United 
States and that consumer consumption activities account for 102% of U.S. 
emissions.9 Although reductions in consumer energy demand offer an efficient 
approach for reducing a significant volume of greenhouse gas emissions,10 core 
regulatory approaches are directed upstream to manufacturers and energy producers 
manufacturing process of jeans and direct impacts occasioned by consumers’ washing and 
disposal of the jeans). 
3 Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1, at 541–84 (charting the direct 
contributions of individuals to various environmental harms). 
4 Id. at 517 (“With few exceptions, the environmental laws enacted since the 1970s 
have directed command and control requirements at large industrial sources of pollution.”). 
5 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 213 (2004); see also 
CZARNEZKI, supra note 1, at 142 (“It has become more difficult to appreciate the ecological 
consequences of our daily activities as modern society becomes further removed from our 
sources of food and energy, and from the natural resources that serve as raw materials.”). 
6 Betsy Taylor & Dave Tilford, Why Consumption Matters, in THE CONSUMER SOCIETY 
READER 475, 482 (Juliet B. Schor & Doublas B. Holt eds., 2000); see also Victor B. Flatt, 
Too Big to Jail or Too Abstract (or Rich?) to Care, 72 MD. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2013) 
(“[T]he impacts of environmental harm have come to seem less immediate and threatening, 
and therefore are seen as less of a threat to the social order.”). 
7 Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge, supra note 1, at 10549. 
8 Id. 
9 Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to U.S. Energy Use and 
the Related CO2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 197, 203–05 (2005) (explaining that the fact 
that the total exceeds 100% reflects emissions embodied in imported goods). 
10 Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions, supra note 1, at 1703 (“[T]he 
individual and household sector represents an enormous and largely untapped source of 
prompt, low-cost emissions reductions.”). 
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and rely primarily on measures that would reduce demand indirectly, as by raising 
the cost of energy or mandating product efficiency.11 Proposals that raise consumer 
energy costs struggle to find political support; product efficiency mandates are 
vulnerable to overall increases in demand resulting from consumer behaviors, 
including the rebound effect (increases in product use when the produce becomes 
more energy efficient and therefore less expensive to operate) or junker effects 
(increases in the duration of the use of older, more inefficient products when energy 
efficiency requirements cause new replacement products to become more 
expensive).12 
 Reorienting law and policy to more directly address and limit the harms arising 
from environmentally significant individual behaviors could thus yield significant 
benefits. Doing so will, however, require new regulatory approaches and better 
information about environmentally significant behaviors.13 I have previously 
explained in some detail how modalities for regulating environmentally significant 
behavior require information about that behavior and so I will not repeat that analysis 
here,14 but the need for information to support regulation is readily apparent. Before 
we can deploy norm management to encourage voluntary behavior change by 
educating individuals about the environmental harms occasioned by their behavior, 
we must understand those behaviors and their environmental effects, as well as 
communicate them to individuals.15 Before we can use a market approach to charge 
individuals for consumption of a public environmental good, we must be able to 
discern and track how individuals consume that good.16 To effectively impose a 
mandate prohibiting behavior, we must have some means to identify violations and 
11 John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: 
Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 108 (2008) (lamenting that “the 
comprehensive bills currently before Congress focus primarily on large emitting entities”; 
exhorting Congress to “also actively engage individuals in the implementation of any climate 
change legislation”; and explaining that “[t]he need for individual citizen involvement is 
necessary for a variety of reasons, including the importance of ensuring proper 
implementation, the need to reduce GHG emissions as rapidly as possible, and the significant 
contribution that individuals make to GHG emissions”). 
12 Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a 
Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 119, 
148–49, 157 (2005). 
13 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Consumption, and Environmental 
Protection, in HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH IN SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION (Lucia Reisch & 
John Thøgersen eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4) (on file with Utah Law Review) 
(advocating the use of choice architecture and libertarian paternalism to achieve 
environmental benefits by shaping consumer behavior while preserving choice in a way that 
“expands the policy toolbox”). 
14 Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental Information: The Promise and Perils 
of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1565, 1575–95 (2012). 
15 Vandenbergh & Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral Individual, supra note 1, at 1707 
(describing how information can aid norm development). 
16 Kuh, supra note 14, at 1585–91. 
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enforce the mandate.17 More generally, better information about environmentally 
significant individual behaviors and their impacts may be crucial for generating the 
personal and political will to support the adoption and implementation of policies 
directed to those behaviors.18  
The capacity for developing information about environmentally significant 
individual behaviors and deploying that information in support of regulation has 
grown rapidly with advances in technology.19 Remote sensing, for example, is being 
deployed in support of environmental regulation in a number of contexts.20 The 
17 Id. at 1593–95; see also Felicity Barringer, With Data and Resolve, Tacoma Fights 
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2014, at A17 (describing the use of advanced monitoring 
techniques to identify and track storm water discharges). In Tacoma, the “forensic work of 
the scientists and the city changed the ability to enforce antipollution laws.” Barringer, supra, 
at A17. Dr. Joel Baker, science director of the Center for Urban Waters in Tacoma, “talk[s] 
about being able to go to anyone—an individual, a house, a business—who is discharging 
something . . . and unambiguously trace back to them. That gets you into a whole different 
conversation with people about responsibilities and remedies.” Id. 
18 Flatt, supra note 6, at 1371 (“Without a will, there is no way, and no funding, focus, 
or public pressure to stem this tide . . . [W]e should try and help people understand that 
environmental harms are more immediate to spur them into supporting stronger 
environmental policies and enforcement for themselves and for others.”); Mark S. McCaffrey 
& Susan M. Buhr, Toward a Climate-Literate Society, [2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law 
Inst.) 10838, 10838 (describing a study showing that knowledge about the causes of climate 
change often correlates with a stated intention to support mitigation policies); Paul C. Stern 
et al., A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of 
Environmentalism, 6 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 81, 83–84 (1999) (discussing the Value-Belief-
Norm theory with respect to civic behaviors). 
19 Kuh, supra note 14, at 1566–67; Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance, 
2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1638 (describing how technology has greatly increased the 
availability of environmental data and observing that “[t]he scale of data available, the 
practice of translating them into usable knowledge, and the participants in those efforts are 
each experiencing qualitative shifts. . . . Agencies must grapple with a paradigmatic change 
in how policy-relevant knowledge is produced, as well as with the demand for new regulatory 
practices that it will bring.”). 
20 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REMOTE SENSING 
PROGRAM FOR EPA FY 2006 PROGRAM SUMMARY 1–2 (2007) (summarizing the use of 
remote sensing to support EPA programs); William Boyd, Ways of Seeing Environmental 
Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 
884–91 (2010) (describing the use of remote sensing technology in the management of 
forests and land use); see also Macey, supra note 19, at 1666–67 (describing how remote 
sensing and other technologies will enable “data-intensive regulation” and observing that 
“[a]cross geographies, data are gathered at new scales and in near real time, through nimble 
networks in which members of the public can serve as nodes”). See generally Erin J. Coburn, 
Protecting Our Environment in a Virtual Age: How Wildlife Webcams Could Strengthen 
Enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
11021 (arguing that an individual that views species via wildlife webcam should be 
recognized as having standing under the Endangered Species Act); Nicole Giffin, Note, 
Privacy Issues Surrounding the Tracking and Sharing of Boat Movement Information as Part 
of Invasive Species Prevention Programs, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 141 (2013) 
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“smart city” provides perhaps the best example of using technology, including 
remote sensing, to generate information about and shape environmentally significant 
individual behaviors. A smart city is a “place[] where information technology is 
combined with infrastructure, architecture, everyday objects, and even our bodies to 
address social, economic, and environmental problems.”21 Songdo, South Korea, a 
newly constructed smart city, is described as follows:   
 
Songdo is the world’s largest experiment in urban automation, with 
millions of sensors deployed in its roads, electrical grids, water and waste 
systems to precisely track, respond to, and even predict the flow of people 
and material. . . . Plans call for cameras that detect the presence of 
pedestrians at night in order to save energy safely by automatically 
extinguishing street lighting on empty blocks. Passing automobiles with 
RFID-equipped license plates will be scanned . . . to create a real-time 
map of vehicle movements and, over time, the ability to predict future 
traffic patterns based on the trove of past measurements. A smart 
electricity grid will communicate with home appliances, perhaps 
anticipating the evening drawdown of juice as tens of thousands of 
programmable rice cookers count down to dinnertime.22  
 
A basic premise of smart cities is that technology will track and store data about 
resident behavior that can be used by the city to manage those behaviors for a variety 
of beneficial purposes, including reducing energy demand and achieving other 
environmental objectives.23 Finally, this new data may help to “objectify[] . . . and 
fram[e]” the challenge of limiting environmental harms arising from 
environmentally significant individual behaviors, “thereby shaping the possibilities 
for particular legal and policy responses.”24 As one scholar has noted, “particular 
scientific and technological knowledge practices make environmental problems into 
coherent objects of governance” and “[s]uch knowledge practices, or ways of seeing, 
are instrumental in shaping regulatory possibilities . . . .”25  
 To summarize, individuals are increasingly recognized as an important source 
of environmental harm that warrants greater policy attention; designing and 
implementing effective policies will require information about environmentally 
significant individual behaviors; and technology makes it feasible to develop such 
information. Developing information about environmentally significant individual 
(evaluating the use of electronic tracking of boats to prevent the spread of quagga and zebra 
mussels). 
21 ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC HACKERS, AND THE 
QUEST FOR A NEW UTOPIA 15 (2013). 
22 Id. at 24 (citation omitted). 
23 Id. at 29 (describing the use of data in Songdo, South Korea); id. at 38–42 (describing 
the ecological benefits of the smart grid); id. at 205–12 (describing data-driven 
management). 
24 Boyd, supra note 20, at 898. 
25 Id. at 843. 
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behaviors can, however, occasion significant concerns about privacy. With respect 
to smart cities, one author remarks: “The extent to which mass urban surveillance 
will be tolerated in smart cities will differ around the world. Government, with 
varying degrees of citizen input, will need to strike a balance between the costs of 
intrusion and the benefits of early detection.”26 Privacy concerns occasioned by the 
installation of smart meters have caused some communities to vote to ban their 
installation and have caused regulators to alter the way the technology is deployed.27 
Recently, false reports about the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) use of 
drones to detect Clean Water Act (CWA) violations (which originated in complaints 
about the EPA’s use of small aircraft for the same purpose) generated a voluble 
outcry about government intrusion on privacy.28 And scholars have flagged potential 
constitutional limits, grounded in privacy, on the use of Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) technology and remote sensing in support of environmental 
regulation.29 
 In light of the growing regulatory and political imperative to identify, 
understand, and address environmentally significant individual behaviors and the 
emerging technical capacity for doing so, it will become increasingly necessary for 
environmental policy to navigate privacy issues. This Article looks to nuisance 
doctrine, surveillance under environmental statutes, and Fourth Amendment cases 
arising in implementation of fish and game laws (the hunter enforcement cases) to 
better understand our experience, to date, balancing the need for environmental 
information with privacy. Section A analyzes common law nuisance and its 
relationship to individual privacy concerns and concludes that the law affords little 
26 TOWNSEND, supra note 21, at 274 (“Americans seem resigned to muddle through, 
leaving the courts to settle conflicts over digital surveillance and privacy on a case-by-case 
basis.”). 
27 Kuh, supra note 14, at 1613–22. 
28 David A. Fahrenthold, Reining in the Rumor About EPA ‘Drones,’ WASH. POST (June 
18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/reining-in-the-rumors-about-epa-
drones/2012/06/16/gJQAwWjkhV_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3R9-QKQD. 
29 E.g., Peter M. Flannery, Note, How to Pry with Maps: The Fourth Amendment 
Privacy Implications of Governmental Wetland Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 29 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 447, 472 (2003) (“Under the current law . . . a wetland 
GIS is likely to infringe upon the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of homeowners in 
several factual circumstances. In light of this circumstance, federal and state governments 
should proceed with the utmost caution in planning and constructing such a project, or 
perhaps reconsider it altogether.” (citation omitted)); Giffin, supra note 20, at 154 (arguing 
that electronic tracking of boats could help to prevent the spread of quagga and zebra mussels 
but concluding that “the implementation of a real-time regional tracking system is not 
feasible for privacy, constitutional, and practical reasons” and endorsing alternate means of 
mussel control); Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use 
and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 219, 251–52 (2002) (providing an overview of remote sensing technologies 
and their actual and potential use in environmental regulation and observing that “[t]he main 
constitutional issues facing remote sensing data are allegations of invasions of privacy and 
warrantless searches” (citation omitted)). 
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value to or protection of privacy in the context of at least one type of environmental 
externality—conduct that gives rise to a common law nuisance. Recognizing that 
most environmentally significant individual behaviors do not constitute a common 
law nuisance, Section B then considers how privacy values are balanced with the 
need for information to support the development and enforcement of environmental 
statutes designed to regulate (primarily industrial) conduct that often imposes harm 
only in the aggregate. Section C focuses on how the Fourth Amendment has been 
applied with respect to enforcement of a subset of environmental statutes—fish and 
game laws.  
 The hunter enforcement cases discussed in Section C provide a particularly 
useful analogue for thinking about privacy balancing with respect to 
environmentally significant behaviors. As with other environmentally significant 
behaviors, the conduct of an individual hunter will generally give rise to an 
environmental harm (for example, impacting the health of game populations) only 
when aggregated with the actions of others. Moreover, the hunter enforcement cases 
provide a context where regulation is being applied primarily to individuals, as 
opposed to corporate entities. The hunter enforcement cases suggest potentially 
useful guidance for policymakers and courts navigating privacy balancing in the 
context of environmentally significant behaviors. Notably, although aggregation is 
required for the regulated conduct to give rise to an environmental harm and 
although privacy intrusions are incurred by individuals, privacy balancing is 
nonetheless often struck in favor of regulatory enforcement in the hunter 
enforcement cases. This, in turn, suggests the possibility that privacy balancing 
might likewise favor regulation with respect to other environmentally significant 
behaviors, provided that the state interest in regulation can be firmly established.   
 
II.  PRIVACY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
A.  Nuisance 
 
 Common law nuisance is a useful starting point for exploring the intersection 
between environmental protection and privacy, both because common law nuisance 
embodies principles that are reflected in and continue to influence the application of 
the modern environmental statutory regime30 and because, as described below, 
nuisance doctrine can be understood to effect a rather stark waiver of privacy.   
 Nuisance intersects with privacy in a myriad of ways. Nuisance doctrine seeks, 
in part, to protect the privacy of individuals by preventing intrusions on the use and 
enjoyment of property; thus, interference with use and enjoyment of property can 
arise from diminution of privacy.31 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains, 
30 CEEED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324 (Ct. 
App. 1974) (“Current legislation for environmental and ecological protection constitutes but 
‘a sensitizing of and refinement of nuisance law.’”) (quoting CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE, 
DONALD G. HAGMAN ET AL., 28–29 (1969 & Supp. 1973)).  
31 Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty., 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908) 
(observing that a county’s construction of a jail caused a neighbor’s “right of privacy [to] 
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“Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using lands is often as important to 
a person as freedom from physical interruption with his use or freedom from 
detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself.”32 On the flip side, 
alleged nuisance conduct has been defended on the ground that it was necessary to 
protect the alleged nuisancer’s privacy—in one case, for example, a court held that 
a neighbor’s high fence was not a nuisance, in part because “the fence served a useful 
purpose by protecting the [neighbor’s] privacy . . . .”33 Some nuisance ordinances 
have been challenged on the grounds that they violate fundamental privacy rights. 
In City of New York v. New St. Mark’s Baths,34 for example, a bathhouse 
permanently enjoined from maintaining a public nuisance argued that “a right to 
privacy prohibits regulation of gay sexual activity in private rooms on the 
premises”35 (the court rejected the argument, citing to precedent for the proposition 
that the right to privacy extends only to conduct in a “noncommercial, private 
setting”36). 
 However, the chief way that nuisance intersects with privacy is embedded in 
and flows from a core doctrinal contour of nuisance: the value of the defendant’s 
conduct. To evaluate whether conduct gives rise to a nuisance, courts usually 
consider the utility or value of the defendant’s conduct.37 The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, for example, provides that “[o]ne is subject to liability for a private 
nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is . . . intentional 
be[] invaded” and that “[t]his right is well recognized” and “derived from natural law”); 
Begnaud v. Camel Contractors, Inc., 721 So. 2d 550, 554 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (“Whether an 
owner of property is liable to his neighbors under the Civil Code Articles of vicinage, 
La.Civ.Code arts. 667–669, is a determination to be made by the trier of fact based upon the 
reasonableness of the conduct in light of the circumstances, and such an analysis requires 
consideration of factors such as the character of the neighborhood, the degree of intrusion 
privacy and the effect of the activity on the health and safety of the neighbors.” (citation 
omitted)); Omar Saleem, Killing the Proverbial Two Birds with One Stone: Using 
Environmental Statutes and Nuisance to Combat the Crime of Illegal Drug Trafficking, 100 
DICK. L. REV. 685, 710 (1996) (“Historically, nuisance laws have protected the individual’s 
zone of privacy.”). 
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1979). 
33 Mickel v. Norton, 69 So. 3d 1081, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). 
34 168 A.D.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
35 Id. at 311. 
36 People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941 (N.Y. 1980).    
37 A nuisance can sometimes also be found without considering the utility of the 
defendant’s conduct by looking narrowly at the gravity of the harm imposed on the plaintiff. 
E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A (1979) (“An intentional invasion of 
another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm resulting from 
the invasion is severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without 
compensation.”); see also Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, 
Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 229–35 (1990) (characterizing this approach as 
the “plaintiff-centered” perspective on nuisance law). 
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and unreasonable . . . .”38 Conduct can be “unreasonable” so as to support a finding 
of nuisance, “if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s 
conduct[,]”39 and the utility of conduct can be assessed by considering “(a) the social 
value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability 
of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of 
preventing or avoiding the invasion.”40 Although there is muddiness and variation 
in the precise manner in which different jurisdictions incorporate the utility or value 
of the defendant’s conduct into the analysis of whether the conduct gives rise to an 
actionable nuisance, most jurisdictions assess the value or utility of the defendant’s 
alleged nuisance conduct in some fashion.41   
 Accordingly, the legal test for determining whether conduct gives rise to a 
nuisance compels scrutiny of the conduct at issue. This is reflected in the application 
of discovery rules in nuisance actions. Model nuisance interrogatories, for example, 
request inter alia that the defendant “[d]escribe the nature of the business 
conducted” at the property, “[s]et forth the purpose and use of the real estate of the 
defendant,” and “[s]tate what caused the soot to emit from the factory.”42 Discovery 
rules also generally permit the inspection of property.43 Entry onto property is most 
appropriate “where the current condition of property is at issue or may have 
evidentiary value,”44 as is often the case in nuisance actions. Some courts appear 
more inclined to grant broad discovery to “enhance the fact-finding process” in cases 
“affecting not only the property rights of the plaintiff but environmental rights of the 
public.”45   
 In granting discovery orders, including in nuisance actions, courts are meant to 
consider privacy interests. For example, in a case where an individual alleged that a 
neighboring residence constituted a nuisance based on the condition and 
maintenance of the property, a trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel 
discovery to investigate the nuisance that would have permitted the plaintiff to 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
39 Id. § 826(a). 
40 Id. § 828. 
41 For an excellent overview of the development and application of utility assessments 
in nuisance doctrine, see Lewin, supra note 37, at 191–236. 
42 10B MARC G. PERLIN & STEVEN H. BLUM, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES: 
PROCEDURAL FORMS ANNOTATED § 79:31 (6th ed. 2009). 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2) (“A party may serve on any other party a request within the 
scope of Rule 26(b) to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or 
controlled by the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, 
photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it.”); see 
8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2206, (3d ed. Supp. 2014) (observing that “[t]his procedure has been fruitfully used in a 
number of cases”). 
44 15A WASH. PRAC. HANDBOOK CIV. PROC. § 50.1 (2013–2014 ed.). 
45 Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., Civ. A. No. 85-4085, 1986 WL 8720, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1986) (granting discovery order for inspection and testing of PCB-
contaminated property). 
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inspect, measure, photograph, test, and sample the neighboring property.46 The trial 
court’s discovery order was vacated on appeal on the ground that the trial court failed 
to apply the proper legal standard to the motion.47 The reviewing court reasoned that 
in crafting discovery orders, trial courts “must balance the degree to which the 
proposed inspection would aid in the search for truth against the burdens and dangers 
posed by the inspection, and limit the frequency or extent of use of the discovery 
methods to prevent undue burden.” In this case, “the record indicates that the trial 
court did not undertake an analysis of the burdens and risks the Gilletts’ discovery 
request posed to Fletcher’s privacy, but, instead, considered only the test for 
relevance . . . .”48 
 However, broad discovery orders are regularly granted in nuisance actions. In 
Whittle v. Weber,49 the plaintiff alleged that his neighbor’s property gave rise to a 
nuisance and sought a discovery order to inspect the neighbor’s property “for 
purposes of conducting an inspection of the items placed upon [the] land to 
determine whether or not hazardous substances or substances of any other nature 
exist[ed] that could present a threat to the neighbors surrounding [the] property 
and/or the ground water beneath their property.”50 The superior court granted the 
discovery order with the limitation that the inspection not “extend to inside any 
residence.”51 On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the discovery order did 
not violate the neighbor’s right to privacy because the property was directly at issue 
in the case, the inspection was specific about the information sought, and the order 
did not permit inspection of the inside of the residence.52 
 The plaintiff in another case, Coldani v. Hamm,53 sued a neighbor who operated 
a dairy farm alleging that runoff from the dairy farm was contaminating groundwater 
in violation of the CWA and interfering with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his 
property, thereby constituting a state law public nuisance. At one point during the 
protracted (and ultimately unsuccessful) litigation, the court authorized an 
inspection of the dairy farm property under Rule 34 “for purposes of testing the soil, 
sediment and groundwater.”54 The need for the inspection was explained by the 
court as follows:  
 
Plaintiff intends to take samples . . . to show not only that nitrates exist in 
the groundwater, but also in order to trace the nitrates to defendants’ 
ranching operations. In particular, plaintiff believes that antibiotics, 
hormones, nutritional supplements, pesticides and fertilizers used in 
defendants’ ranching operations will appear together with nitrates in the 
46 See Gillett v. Conner, 133 P.3d 960, 961 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 961, 964. 
49 243 P.3d 208 (Alaska 2010). 
50 Id. at 210.   
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 213. 
53 No. CIV S-07-0660 JAM EFB, 2008 WL 3992719, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008). 
54 Id. at *1. 
                                                          
2015] ENVIRONMENTAL PRIVACY 11 
allegedly contaminated groundwater. Plaintiff argues that the presence of 
such substances in the groundwater will link Lima Ranch to the alleged 
nitrate contamination.55  
 
The court also granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to five 
interrogatories that asked the owners of the dairy farm “to identify all antibiotics, 
hormones and nutritional supplements administered to livestock at [the dairy farm] 
from 1990 to present” and “to identify all fertilizers and pesticides used at [the dairy 
farm] from 1990 to present.”56 
 And, perhaps most notably, in one case involving nuisance-like facts, a 
potential nuisance defendant was authorized to inspect and test the plaintiff’s 
property. In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corporation,57 the operator of an aluminum 
plant, fearing that a neighbor who raised cattle was going to bring suit alleging that 
fluoride emissions from the plant damaged his property and cattle, petitioned to 
examine the neighbor’s real property and cattle.58 The court upheld an order under 
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing the plant owner to enter 
and inspect the neighbor’s property, including “[o]btaining specimen samples of 
forage, feeds, air, water, soil, vegetation and mineral supplements,” “[e]xamining 
the pastures and supplemental feed” of the cattle, “[p]hotographing the animals, 
foodstuffs, pastures and facilities,” and examining the cattle, including by taking 
urine samples.59 
 The imperative to assess the utility of the defendant’s conduct in nuisance 
actions, and balance it against the harm to the plaintiff, can thus compel an invasive 
fact finding process. Yet, there is little discussion of how utility assessments in 
nuisance inquiries affect privacy. This is, perhaps, not surprising. All litigation to 
some extent opens one up to potentially invasive discovery and the disclosure of 
private information.60 Claims to privacy for nuisance conduct may be unlikely or 
weak because at least some aspects of the conduct are necessarily not private as they 
are manifest outside of the nuisancer’s property. There is no mystery about the 
conduct underlying many common sources of nuisance—a smokestack bellowing 
smoke or a penned livestock generating a stench. The interest in privacy with respect 
to nuisance conduct may simply be subordinate to the interests of other property 
owners. Nuisancers, of course, forfeit far more than privacy with respect to their 
nuisance conduct; they can lose the freedom to engage in the conduct all together, 
or at least for free, thus rendering the loss of privacy relatively less notable. 
Nuisancers may even lose the possibility for compensation for a taking under the 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at *2. 
57 297 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1961). 
58 Id. at 52. 
59 Id. at 53 n.1. 
60 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1145–49 (2002) (describing the information generated 
about individuals during civil and criminal proceedings and observing that “[c]ourt records 
are potentially the most revealing records about individuals”). 
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“nuisance exception” to takings, which provides that there is no regulatory taking 
where property is deemed a nuisance under the common law, including with respect 
to actions taken under environmental statutes.61   
 Another possibility, and one that is intriguing for understanding environmental 
privacy, is that the indifference to privacy in the context of nuisance reflects, at least 
in part, a sense that claims to privacy for nuisance conduct are waived by the 
nuisancer’s decision to impose an environmental externality on others.62 This 
possible quid pro quo between the decision to impose an externality and privacy 
finds clear expression in a line of cases invoking the community caretaking doctrine 
pursuant to which some courts have found that government officers can enter 
property to abate a nuisance without a warrant.63 In United States v. Rohrig,64 for 
example, officers responding to noise complaints entered a home without a warrant 
and seized marijuana discovered in plain view.65 In upholding the warrantless entry 
and seizure of the marijuana, the Sixth Circuit reasoned:   
 
Just as one’s expectation of privacy diminishes as he ventures beyond his 
doorway, . . . Defendant here undermined his right to be left alone by 
projecting loud noises into the neighborhood in the wee hours of the 
morning, thereby significantly disrupting his neighbors’ peace. Indeed, in 
this case, we cannot protect Defendant’s interest in maintaining the 
61 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–32 (1992) (explaining that 
confiscatory regulations “must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background 
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership”). 
Id. at 1029. Notably, in describing the inquiry to be undertaken to assess whether the nuisance 
exception applies, the Supreme Court cites to the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 826 
and 827, and advises that it will “ordinarily entail[] . . . analysis of, among other things, the 
degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the 
claimant’s proposed activities, . . . the social value of the claimant’s activities and their 
suitability to the locality in question . . . .” Id. at 1030–31 (citations omitted). 
62 The conduct underlying a nuisance must generally be intentional, although that term 
is, importantly, understood to include simply knowing that engaging in the conduct is causing 
or substantially certain to cause the nuisancing effect. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 825(b) (1979). 
63 See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1522 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
warrantless intrusion based upon nuisance created by loud music that severely disturbed 
neighbors); People v. Lanthier, 488 P.2d 625, 628 (Cal. 1971) (upholding warrantless search 
of locker based on smell that led to discovery of marijuana); Olson v. Maryland, 56 A.3d 
576, 606 – 07 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (upholding warrantless entry to abate noise 
nuisance). Note that several circuits have limited the community caretaking doctrine, and 
reliance on it, for warrantless searches to automobiles, and some courts have noted that it 
may simply be a type of exigent circumstance. See, e.g., Ray v. Township of Warren, 626 
F.3d 170, 175–77 (3rd Cir. 2010) (observing that “[t]here is some confusion among the 
circuits as to whether the community caretaking exception . . . applies to warrantless searches 
of the home” and listing cases). 
64 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996). 
65 Id. at 1509. 
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privacy of his home without diminishing his neighbors’ interests in 
maintaining the privacy of their homes.66 
 
In cases applying the community caretaking doctrine to nuisance abatement, there 
is no mention of privacy with respect to the action causing the nuisance—it seems 
to be assumed that there is no privacy in the nuisance conduct itself. These cases 
typically involve entry to abate the nuisance during which some evidence of 
contraband is discovered (drugs, guns, etc.) that is unrelated to the nuisance. The 
reasoning in these cases often includes reference to the fact that by engaging in the 
nuisance activity—that imposes an externality on others (noise, smell)—the 
individual has waived his or her expectation of privacy. These cases thus seem to 
reflect a view that there is little expectation of privacy for nuisance conduct and, 
moreover, that by engaging in conduct that gives rise to a nuisance, individuals can 
effect an even broader waiver of privacy.  
 Evaluating nuisance law from a privacy perspective thus suggests, broadly, that 
the law affords little value to or protection of privacy in conduct that imposes at least 
one type of environmental externality, a common law nuisance. Ultimately, 
however, nuisance does not provide a particularly satisfying analogue for exploring 
privacy with respect to environmentally significant behaviors. With respect to both 
nuisance and environmentally significant individual behaviors, the source of the 
externality can be an individual. However, the nature of the externality imposed by 
the individual in each context is distinct. Externalities occasioned by 
environmentally significant individual behaviors often produce environmental 
harms only in the aggregate, when combined with the behaviors of many other 
individuals. And often the harms produced are widespread, dispersed, distant in 
time, and cannot be traced back to a particular individual.67 An individual likely 
could not be held liable in nuisance (or for another tort) for this type of aggregated 
harm occasioned by an environmentally significant individual behavior.68 Tethered 
as it is to traditional understandings of duty, proximate cause, and causation, 
nuisance is “most useful for addressing conflicts between a single source of pollution 
66 Id. at 1522. 
67 See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1, at 589–90. 
68 Imagine, for example, a public nuisance suit premised on the theory that the tailpipe 
emissions from an individual’s car contributed to climate change. It is hard to imagine how 
the requirements of standing could be satisfied—let alone duty, causation, proximate cause, 
and breach—or the requirement to show “an unreasonable interference with a right common 
to the general public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); see David A. 
Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 
28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (2003) (observing that “individual consumers such as drivers 
and users of electricity do not contribute ‘substantially’ to climate change; as such, their 
small individual contributions would not meet the standards for legal causation”). For an 
excellent discussion of the difficulties of applying existing tort doctrine in the context of 
climate change, and with respect to small contributors to large problems more generally, see 
Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 54 
(2011). 
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and a few neighbors.”69 The difficulties using nuisance to address modern 
environmental problems involving “numerous and diverse pollutants emanating 
from widely dispersed sources affect[ing] large populations . . .” 70 spurred the 
creation of modern environmental statutes, which, as discussed next, also intersect 
with privacy in interesting ways.    
 
B.  Environmental Laws 
 
 Common law nuisance has, of course, evolved into a diverse panoply of 
environmental laws that require significant information for their implementation, 
thereby intersecting with interests in privacy.71 The discussion that follows identifies 
some of the ways that environmental laws demand information, the privacy issues 
that this can raise, and the accommodation struck between the regulatory need for 
information and privacy interests. The present survey is not complete—it does not 
claim to represent a categorical review of all environmental laws from all 
jurisdictions—but employs representative examples to illustrate some of the 
common privacy issues that arise with respect to the collection and use of 
information in support of environmental regulations that are most relevant to 
thinking about privacy in the context of environmentally significant individual 
behaviors. At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between an environmental 
regulator requesting the submission of information (interrogation) (for example, 
requiring the submission of information to obtain a permit) and a regulator taking 
information, usually in the context of enforcement (surveillance) (for example, 
conducting searches or inspections to enforce an environmental statute).72 Examples 
69 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 75 (6th ed. 2009). 
70 Id. 
71 This includes both the provision of information to regulators and the public. Pursuant 
to the citizen suit provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA), for example, individuals alleging a violation of the reporting required under the 
statute can use traditional discovery mechanisms to obtain detailed information about the 
release of covered chemicals by an EPCRA-covered entity. Model interrogatories, for 
example, suggest that the citizen suit plaintiff should request that the defendant “state every 
fact that supports” the defendant’s assertions regarding whether it is subject to and has 
complied with EPCRA reporting requirements. 55 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS § 43 (2013) 
(“Do you contend that you have completed and submitted a toxic chemical release form for 
each toxic chemical released during the preceding calendar year? If your answer to the 
preceding interrogatory is yes, please state every fact that supports your contention.”). 
Similarly, pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of CERCLA, individuals alleging a violation 
of the statute can use traditional discovery mechanisms to obtain detailed information about 
the release of CERCLA hazardous substances by a facility, including, for example, an 
interrogatory request to “identify the hazardous substances and/or the extremely hazardous 
substances that have been or are being released from your facility into the environment.” Id. 
72 I borrow the conceptual distinction between interrogation and surveillance from 
Professor Daniel J. Solove. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
477, 490–505 (2006). Professor Solove describes the distinction as: “[s]urveillance is the 
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drawn from the context of environmentally significant individual behaviors could 
include, with respect to interrogation, requirements that individuals reveal to 
regulators the content of their vehicle’s tailpipe emissions by undergoing an 
emissions check73 and, with respect to surveillance, a regulator’s inspection of an 
individual’s private property to ascertain the presence of a jurisdictional wetland 
under the CWA.74 This Section proceeds by providing an overview of the legal 
treatment of interrogation and then focuses on the legal treatment of environmental 
surveillance—specifically on the application of the Fourth Amendment to 
surveillance conducted in support of environmental statutes. 
 
1.  Interrogation 
 
 Attempts to increase interrogation by creating new requirements that 
individuals provide information about environmental behaviors—such as a 
requirement that, like annual taxes, individuals submit annual greenhouse gas 
reporting forms—may be an important tool as policymakers seek to better address 
individuals as sources of environmental harm,75 but it would likely engender privacy 
objections.76 The present analysis does not, however, focus on privacy in the context 
of government requests for information from individuals, largely because there is 
presently little relevant law to explore. As discussed below, the existence and scope 
of constitutional, privacy-based limits on the government’s power to require 
information from individuals remains uncertain and, while there is intense interest 
in developing protections for information privacy,77 existing statutes have only 
watching, listening to, or recording of an individual’s activities. [And] [i]nterrogation 
consists of various forms of questioning or probing for information.” Id. at 490. Further, “[t]o 
some degree, surveillance resembles interrogation, for both involve the involuntary gathering 
of information. Interrogation, however, occurs with the conscious awareness of the subject; 
surveillance can be clandestine.” Id. at 500. 
73 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a, 7512a (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 51.350 (2013). 
74 For a description of CWA inspections, see supra notes 28, 53–56 and accompanying 
text. 
75 See CZARNEZKI, supra note 1, at 61 (proposing a national environmental census 
requiring an individual self-assessment of household environmental impact, including 
activities that give rise to GHG emissions); Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon 
Emissions, supra note 1, at 1729–31 (proposing an Individual Carbon Release Inventory). 
76 See Solove, supra note 72, at 499 (describing privacy objections to census questions 
and observing that “[i]n the late nineteenth century, there was a loud public outcry when the 
U.S. census began including more and more questions relating to personal affairs, such as 
marital status, literacy, property ownership, health, and finances.”). 
77 See e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1815−16 (2011) 
(“Information privacy law has reached a turning point. The current debate about the topic is 
vigorous . . . . Moreover, the Executive Branch, independent agencies, and Congress are all 
considering different paths to revitalize information privacy.”). 
                                                          
16 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
limited relevance for the submission of information in support of environmental 
regulation.78    
 In Whalen v. Roe,79 the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to 
information privacy grounded in an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”80 Whalen involved a challenge to a New York statute requiring 
the submission of a form to the New York State Department of Health that included 
the patient’s name when certain drugs were prescribed. The Court recognized that 
“[t]he mere existence in readily available form of the information about patients’ use 
of Schedule II drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will become 
publicly known . . . ”; however, the court upheld the law, finding that the threat of 
public disclosure was not “sufficiently grievous” to give rise to a constitutional 
infirmity.81   
 Notably, the Court was careful to distinguish the collection of individual 
information by a government agency (interrogation) from searches subject to Fourth 
Amendment protections (surveillance) that it characterized as “involv[ing] 
78 For example, although applicable to federal agencies, including those implementing 
environmental statutes, the Privacy Act of 1974 provides only broad guidelines regarding 
the collection of information by a federal agency. It requires that federal agencies that 
maintain a system of records “maintain in [their] records only such information about an 
individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be 
accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) 
(2012). The Privacy Act further requires that an agency  
 
inform each individual whom it asks to supply information . . . (A) the authority 
. . . which authorizes the solicitation of the information and whether disclosure 
of such information is mandatory or voluntary; (B) the principal purpose or 
purposes for which the information is intended to be used; (C) the routine uses 
which may be made of the information, as published pursuant to paragraph 
(4)(D) of this subsection; and (D) the effects on him, if any, of not providing all 
or any part of the requested information. 
 
Id. § 552a(e)(3); accord 1 C.F.R. § 304.32 (2014). Notably, these Privacy Act provisions are 
subject to exceptions. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 16.11(e) (2013) (exempting the collection of 
information in support of EPA criminal enforcement). A number of environmental statutes 
contain mechanisms that allow entities to protect confidential business information or trade 
secrets, but this has little relevance as applied to individuals. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 1905 
(2012) (setting forth protections for confidential information under CERCLA, which is 
defined to mean information that “concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, 
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount 
or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, 
corporation, or association; or . . . income return or copy thereof or any book containing any 
abstract or particulars”); 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2012) (providing that confidential information 
provided to regulators under the CWA should not be publicly disclosed); 42 U.S.C § 9604(e) 
(2012); 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(b) (2013). 
79 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
80 Id. at 599. 
81 Id. at 600. 
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affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy.”82 
The Court endorsed a scholar’s observation that there are three “‘facets’” to the 
constitutional right of privacy:  
 
The first is the right of the individual to be free in his private affairs from 
governmental surveillance and intrusion. The second is the right of an 
individual not to have his private affairs made public by the government. 
The third is the right of an individual to be free in action, thought, 
experience, and belief from governmental compulsion.83  
 
 The Court declared that “[t]he first of the facets . . . is directly protected by the 
Fourth Amendment” and was not implicated in the present case, which involved 
only the latter two facets of the constitutional right to privacy.84 Whalen thus 
distinguished between information privacy and those privacy interests protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. The constitutional right to information privacy articulated 
in Whalen has not been much explored or developed since.85 Moreover, Whalen 
speaks most directly to a government duty “to protect privacy when it collects 
personal data”86 and less to its ability to collect that information in the first instance. 
Indeed, in Whalen the Court seemed resigned to government collection of copious 
information about individuals: 
 
 Even without public disclosure, it is, of course, true that private 
information must be disclosed to the authorized employees of the New 
York Department of Health. Such disclosures, however, are not . . . 
meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of 
privacy that are associated with many facets of health care. . . . 
[D]isclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital 
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often 
an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure 
may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient.87     
 
82 Id. at 604 n.32. 
83 Id. at 599 n.24 (quoting Philip B. Kurland, The Private I, U. OF CHI. MAG., Autumn 
1976, at 7). 
84 Id. 
85 Solove, supra note 60, at 1205−06 n.413 (observing that “the Court has done little to 
develop the right of information privacy” and that its contours remain unclear); see also 
Solove, supra note 72, at 504 (detailing the lack of legal protection in the context of 
interrogation and concluding that “[p]rivacy law’s theory of interrogation is not only 
incoherent, it is nearly nonexistent. Despite recognizing the harms and problems of 
interrogation—compulsion, divulgence of private information, and forced betrayal—the law 
only addresses them in limited situations”). 
86 Solove, supra note 60, at 1204. 
87 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602. 
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 Ultimately, if environmental regulation seeks more information from 
individuals, that information collection may be contested using theories of 
information privacy. In one interesting case, for example, a district court in New 
Mexico dismissed an action against a member of the Isleta Pueblo for knowing 
possession of parts of a golden eagle without a permit in violation of the Bald and 
Golden Eagle Protection Act in part because the court deemed the procedures for 
obtaining a permit under the Act to be too invasive of privacy.88 The court reasoned: 
 
[T]he intricate application procedure, as it currently operates, is itself 
unnecessarily intrusive and hostile to religious privacy when viewed in 
light of the conservation goals it seeks to achieve. The applicant must 
certify that he is an Indian and will use the feathers or parts for religious 
purposes. He must identify religious leaders and ceremonies to federal 
officials so that the government may gauge the religious character of the 
proposed use. These procedures invade the private, even secret, province 
of Indian religious conviction and offend the ancient tradition of pueblo 
religious independence. . . . The evidence at trial established that the 
federal administrative apparatus erected to accommodate Indian religious 
needs is utterly offensive and ultimately ineffectual. The application 
process is cumbersome, intrusive and demonstrates a palpable 
insensitivity to Indian religious beliefs.89   
 
However, at present there are so few instances where government requests for 
information in support of environmental regulation (interrogation) have been 
challenged on grounds of information privacy that the present analysis looks 
primarily to the resolution of disputes about environmental surveillance grounded in 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
2.  Surveillance 
 
 Environmental regulators also frequently obtain information through 
environmental surveillance.90 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) regulations 
88 United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1304, 1307 (D.N.M. 1986). For another 
example, see Brown v. Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, 577 A.2d 1184 (Me. 
1990), where the court held that a requirement that noncommercial river rafters file a 
registration statement prior to river rafting did not violate the right to privacy, the Fourth 
Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1186. 
89 Abeyta, 632 F. Supp at 1304, 1307. 
90 Notably, private individuals may also obtain significant information through 
discovery in the context of citizen suits, although that is not the focus of the present 
discussion. Model interrogatories suggested for a person or entity alleged to have taken a 
species in violation of the Endangered Species Act demonstrate the broad scope of 
information that may be sought. 27 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 421 § 6 (1994) (“Set forth 
with particularity all activities, actions, or work done by the DEFENDANT on [site of 
alleged takings] since [date]. . . . Set forth with particularity all planned activities, actions, or 
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implementing the CWA, for example, advocate surveillance by the Corps to “detect 
unauthorized activities requiring permits” and encourage district engineers to 
“consider developing joint surveillance procedures with Federal, state, or local 
agencies.”91 Courts have upheld administrative searches aimed at ascertaining 
whether a property contains a jurisdictional wetland.92 Unlike interrogation, 
however, environmental surveillance generates significant legal scrutiny.93 This 
Section provides an overview of environmental surveillance and its legal treatment 
under the Fourth Amendment both to offer a general overview of how existing 
environmental statutes balance implementation and privacy and to provide 
background for a close analysis of environmental surveillance in the specific context 
of the enforcement of fish and game laws (the hunter enforcement cases). 
 Most environmental statutes grant regulators the authority to conduct 
administrative searches.94 Statutes granting this authority include inter alia core 
work to be done by the DEFENDANT on [site of alleged takings]. . . . State with specificity 
any and all remedial measures and any changes whatsoever to the manufacturing processes, 
project, development, or any other activity of the DEFENDANT that have been undertaken 
to minimize or mitigate impacts on any endangered or THREATENED SPECIES and/or its 
habitat.”). 
91 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(a) (2013). 
92 Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying “the special needs 
doctrine to analyze the environmental regulatory scheme that provides for warrantless 
inspections pursuant to tidal-wetlands permit applications”); In re Alameda Cnty. Assessor’s 
Parcel Nos. 537-801-2-4 and 537-850-9, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(upholding EPA access to farm property and concluding that “[t]he EPA is justified under 
the present circumstances in conducting a jurisdictional determination of the wetland status 
of petitioners’ farm pursuant to an administrative search warrant granted under § 308”). 
93 Joseph G. Block & Judson W. Starr, “Knock, Knock.” “Who’s There?” “EPA 
Criminal Agents That’s Who.” 55 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. INST.12-1, § 12.02 (2009) 
(“Should the government attempt a warrantless entry, search, or seizure, the authors 
recommend that the company voice its objection for the record, to begin laying the 
groundwork for a legal challenge to any evidence the government seizes.”). 
94 For an overview of EPA inspection and evaluation authority, see 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/monitoring/inspections/,archived at http://perma.cc/FJ9D-
4VT3 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). The precise contours of an administrative search are not 
clear: “Most experts agree that government searches that are conducted pursuant to a neutral 
policy aimed at a non-law enforcement purpose are administrative searches, but they also 
recognize that many searches that do not fall within this definition are administrative as 
well.” Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
254, 257 n.15 (2011). Although it is common for environmental statutes to authorize 
administrative searches, the practice does occasion objection on privacy grounds. E.g., H.R. 
3875, 103d Cong. §§ 3(a), 4(a) (1994); S. 1915, 103d Cong. (1994) (proposing legislation to 
require federal agencies to comply with applicable state and tribal laws relating to private 
property rights and privacy and prohibiting federal agencies that are implementing the 
Endangered Species Act or wetlands regulations from entering private property for the 
purpose of gathering information without written consent from the owner.); see also S. 605, 
104th Cong. §§ 503(a), 504(a) (1995) (proposing owner consent requirements for agency 
entry to private property). 
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environmental statutes such as the CWA;95 Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA);96 Clean Air Act (CAA);97 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA);98 Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA);99 and Endangered Species Act (ESA).100 Generally speaking, the Fourth 
Amendment has been interpreted to require a warrant for an administrative search 
involving a private individual101 or commercial entity.102 There are, however, a 
95 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (2012) (“[T]he Administrator or his authorized representative 
. . . shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises in which an effluent source 
is located or in which any records required to be maintained under clause (A) of this 
subsection are located, and . . . may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records, 
inspect any monitoring equipment or method required under clause (A), and sample any 
effluents which the owner or operator of such source is required to sample under such 
clause.”). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (2012) (“For the purposes of developing or assisting in the 
development of any regulation or enforcing the provisions of this chapter, . . . such officers, 
employees or representatives are authorized—(1) to enter at reasonable times any 
establishment or other place where hazardous wastes are or have been generated, stored, 
treated, disposed of, or transported from; (2) to inspect and obtain samples from any person 
of any such wastes and samples of any containers or labeling for such wastes.”). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (2012) (“[T]he Administrator or his authorized representative, 
upon presentation of his credentials—(A) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any 
premises of such person or in which any records required to be maintained under paragraph 
(1) of this section are located, and (B) may at reasonable times have access to and copy any 
records, inspect any monitoring equipment or method required under paragraph (1), and 
sample any emissions which such person is required to sample under paragraph (1).”).  
98 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(3) (2012) (“Any officer, employee, or representative described 
in paragraph (1) is authorized to enter at reasonable times any of the following:  (A) Any 
vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where any hazardous substance or 
pollutant or contaminant may be or has been generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or 
transported from.  (B) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property from 
which or to which a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant has been or may have 
been released.  (C) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where such 
release is or may be threatened.  (D) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or 
property where entry is needed to determine the need for response or the appropriate response 
or to effectuate a response action under this subchapter.”). 
99 15 U.S.C.§ 2610(a) (2012) (“For purposes of administering this chapter, the 
Administrator, and any duly designated representative of the Administrator, may inspect any 
establishment, facility, or other premises in which chemical substances, mixtures, or products 
subject to subchapter IV of this chapter are manufactured, processed, stored, or held . . . .”). 
100 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(1)–(3) (2012) (granting agencies the authority to enforce its 
provisions, including by “execut[ing] and serv[ing] any . . . search warrant” and “search[ing] 
and seiz[ing], with or without a warrant, as authorized by law,” as well as authorizing district 
courts to issue warrants in support of agency enforcement).    
101 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
102 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544–45 (1967) (holding that “warrants are a 
necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial 
premises,” but observing that “[t]he agency’s particular demand for access will of course be 
measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of 
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number of caveats and exceptions. Those caveats and exceptions of particular 
relevance in the environmental context are discussed in greater detail below.  
 Under the “open fields” doctrine, the Supreme Court holds that there is no 
expectation of privacy, and thus no Fourth Amendment protection, for “activities 
conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the 
home.”103 It is not unusual for environmental administrative searches to involve 
inspections of outdoor areas and numerous cases have upheld warrantless 
administrative searches by environmental regulators under the open fields 
doctrine.104 The Supreme Court, for example, has held that warrantless entry by a 
state environmental official on commercial premises for purposes of observing the 
quality of smoke emitted from a facility did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it 
fell within the open fields exception.105 The Court further held that the EPA did not 
conduct a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when it took aerial 
photographs of an industrial plant complex as part of a site inspection under the 
Clean Air Act.106 Notably, however, the court found it important that the entity 
observed was a commercial entity and not a private residence.107 
 The open fields doctrine does, of course, have limitations. In Reeves Brothers, 
Inc. v. EPA,108 a district court in Virginia held that EPA agents violated the Fourth 
Amendment by entering plaintiff’s property without consent and removing water 
and soil samples.109 In that case, the agency, while investigating the possible 
presence of hazardous substances pursuant to CERCLA, failed to follow the 
procedures for access set out in section 104(e) of CERCLA. The court reasoned that 
the agency’s access to the property likely did not require a warrant pursuant to the 
open fields exception, but that the taking of water and soil samples did not fall within 
the open fields exception.110 The court, considering whether the plaintiff had 
reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the 
particular regulation involved”). 
103 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173, 178 (1984); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. 
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (upholding warrantless aerial inspection under the 
CAA); Air Pollution Variance Bd v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (upholding 
warrantless EPA inspection of smoke plume). 
104 E.g., United States v. Acquest Wehrle, LLC, No. 09-CV-637C(F), 2010 WL 
1708528, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010) (holding that entry onto private property to enforce 
the CWA fell within the open fields exception); State v. Paxton, 615 N.E.2d 1086, 1092 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (upholding warrantless inspection of commercial property improperly 
used for solid waste disposal). 
105 Air Pollution Variance Bd., 416 U.S. at 864–65. 
106 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 232. 
107 Id. at 237 n.4 (“We find it important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to 
a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.”). 
108 956 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Va. 1995). 
109 Id. at 670; see also Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 935 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 987–88 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (declining to dismiss action challenging the 
warrantless search of a mine by an official from California’s Department of Fish and Game 
under the open fields or closely regulated industry doctrine). 
110 Reeves Brothers, Inc., 956 F. Supp. at 669. 
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exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and whether the expectation was one 
society recognizes as reasonable, found that the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to the soil beneath the surface of the open field where the 
rubber materials in question had been purposefully buried and surrounded by a fence 
with “No Trespassing” signs.111 The Supreme Court has similarly held that there is 
no expectation of privacy in (and hence no Fourth Amendment protection for) 
garbage.112 For this reason, environmental regulators’ warrantless collection and 
testing of wastes and effluent has been upheld.113 
 Other relevant exceptions with respect to environmental administrative 
searches are searches conducted with consent and searches involving a closely 
regulated entity. When an individual or entity consents to a search, regulators need 
not obtain a warrant.114 Many administrative searches in the environmental realm 
constitute inspections of regulated entities operating pursuant to required permits. 
Often, environmental permits provide for inspections by regulators. Regulations 
implementing the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) under 
the CWA, for example, provide that NPDES permits “shall allow the Director, or an 
authorized representative . . . to . . . [e]nter upon the permittee’s premises where a 
regulated facility or activity is located or conducted.”115 Courts have upheld 
warrantless searches under some environmental statutes on the ground that an entity 
possessing a permit thereby consents to warrantless administrative searches.116 And, 
111 Id. at 670. 
112 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). 
113 E.g., Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare, 392 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding a 
business had no reasonable expectation of privacy in wastewater flowing irretrievably into a 
public sewer system) (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988)). 
114 E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well settled 
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and 
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). Of course, the consent 
must be deemed effective by the court. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.2(b), at 51–53 (David C. Baum ed., 5th ed. 
2012) (discussing the application of the voluntariness test for Fourth Amendment consent in 
the context of administrative searches). 
115 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(i) (2007). 
116 E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187, 1190 (7th Cir.1983) (upholding 
inspections to assess permit violations under the CWA with only an administrative warrant); 
United States v. Hajduk, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1227–28 (D. Colo. 2005) (upholding 
warrantless search conducted pursuant to NPDES permit and observing that “[i]n return for 
the privilege of discharging waste, Defendants necessarily consented to application of the 
City Code and Permit requirements as a matter of law under the Fourth Amendment”). But 
see People v. Hedges, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 1982) (declining to 
sanction warrantless search of a shellfish establishment on the basis of a permit, observing 
that “it is not persuasive to argue that this section establishes that the search was consented 
to because acquiescence to the search was a condition of the permit,” and concluding that 
“‘[n]o state may require, as a condition of doing business, a blanket submission to 
warrantless searches at any time and for any purpose’” (quoting Finn’s Liquor Shop, Inc. v. 
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practically speaking, most environmental agencies seeking to obtain access to 
property adopt a policy of first requesting consent, and this consent is often 
granted.117 Thus, a significant number of environmental administrative searches 
proceed with consent and no warrant. 
 Warrantless administrative searches have also been upheld under an exception 
relating to longstanding or pervasive government regulation (often referred to as the 
closely regulated business exception). The rationales for the exception include that 
warrantless searches are necessary for implementation of a regulatory scheme; 
expectations of privacy are lower with respect to commercial or business premises 
than residences; business owners have lower expectations of privacy where 
government regulation is pervasive or longstanding (because the long history of 
government regulation provides notice and consent can thus be assumed); and 
relevant regulations governing the searches provide adequate constitutional 
safeguards.118 As explained by the Supreme Court,  
 
A warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has 
reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further 
a regulatory scheme, and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently 
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot 
help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections 
undertaken for specific purposes.119  
 
For the exception to apply, three circumstances must be present. First, there must be 
a substantial government interest that the warrantless inspection furthers.120 Second, 
warrantless inspections must be necessary for the regulatory scheme.121 Finally, the 
regulatory statute must provide notice that inspections may occur and limits on the 
conduct of those inspections.122 In applying the exception, the Court has emphasized 
State Liquor Authority, 249 N.E.2d 440, 445)); LAFAVE, supra note 114, § 10.2(c) (rejecting 
and condemning the conditional privilege theory). 
117 See, e.g., Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Adm’r, to Reg’l 
Adm’rs and Reg’l Counsels (June 5, 1987), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/product 
ion/files/2013-09/documents/cont-access-mem.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J5VS-
ZEU6. 
118 E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712–16 (1987) (upholding warrantless 
search of vehicle dismantling businesses); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 593–94, 598–
99 (1981) (upholding inspections under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act and finding 
that “[t]he greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects 
the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such 
property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this 
privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory 
schemes authorizing warrantless inspections”); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 
(1972) (upholding warrantless search of gun dealer). 
119 Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600. 
120 Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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the business owner’s choice to enter a highly regulated industry—“when an 
entrepreneur embarks upon such a [highly regulated] business, he has voluntarily 
chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation”123 and “in 
effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.”124 In United States v. Biswell,125 
for example, the court reasoned that “inspections for compliance with the Gun 
Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer’s justifiable expectations of 
privacy” because “[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated 
business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his 
business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective 
inspection.”126 
Courts have relied on the pervasively regulated business exception to uphold 
warrantless administrative searches under a variety of environmental statutes.127 In 
State v. Bonaccurso,128 for example, a New Jersey state court blessed warrantless 
entry on the property of a commercial slaughterhouse by an inspector from the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) under both the open fields 
exception and the closely regulated business exception.129 The inspector witnessed 
123 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (“The element that 
distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close 
government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must 
already be aware.”). 
124 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973). 
125 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
126 Id. at 316. 
127 See United States v. V-1 Oil Co., 63 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding 
unannounced warrantless searches under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act); 
Balelo v. Baldrige, 724 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding regulation requiring vessel 
owners to consent to the placement of observers as a condition of obtaining a commercial 
fishing permit under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 pursuant to the closely 
regulated industry exception); United States v. Kaiyo Maru No. 53, 699 F.2d 989, 995 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (upholding warrantless inspections authorized by the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act);United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1980) (adverting to 
historical and pervasive regulation of the salmon-fishing industry to uphold a warrantless 
boarding of a vessel to enforce Sockeye Salmon or Pink Salmon Fishing Act); Gulf of Me. 
Trawlers v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 927, 932–33 (D. Me. 1987) (“The Magnuson Act 
provides for warrantless searches of vessels reasonably believed to be in violation of the 
provisions of the Act and for the seizure of fish therein, 16 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(1)(A), and the 
reasonableness of these warrantless searches has been expressly upheld in prior cases.”); 
United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 (D. Alaska 1979) (applying Barlow’s 
to uphold a warrantless search under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act); In re 
Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 876 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding warrantless 
administrative search of oil and gas production facility under Louisiana environmental 
statute); State v. Bonaccurso, 545 A.2d 853, 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (upholding 
warrantless inspection under the New Jersey Water Pollution Control Act); Commonwealth 
Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Blosenski Disposal Serv., 566 A.2d 845, 848–50 (Pa. 1989) 
(upholding warrantless inspection under the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act). 
128 545 A.2d 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988). 
129 Id. at 857–58, 860. 
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unpermitted discharges to water that violated the Water Pollution Control Act.130 
The court found that the right of entry granted to the NJDEP in the Water Pollution 
Control Act was “constitutionally sufficient” because “[t]he State has enunciated a 
substantial government interest and has enacted a legislative scheme in response 
which attempts to alleviate the problem in a manner which is reasonable in its time, 
place and manner.”131 But the inquiry regarding the applicability of the closely 
regulated business exception is specific to the statute and industry involved, and the 
Supreme Court has limited the scope of the exception. In Marshall v. Barlow’s, 
Inc.,132 the Court declined to permit the secretary of labor to invoke the exception to 
permit warrantless inspections of business premises under section 8(a) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act.133 Notably, courts have since held that the 
exception does not apply to some core environmental statutes, including the 
CWA;134 Barlow’s likely precludes, or at least casts significant doubt upon, 
application of the closely regulated business exception under many environmental 
statutes. 
 Even when a warrant must be obtained to conduct an administrative 
(environmental) search, the showing required to obtain a warrant may be relaxed. 
With respect to the showing required to obtain an administrative search warrant, 
probable cause to support an administrative search “may be based not only on 
specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable 
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied 
with respect to a particular [establishment].’”135 The agency need not show probable 
cause of a specific statutory violation; it may be enough to demonstrate that the 
inspection is part of a larger regulatory program.136   
130 Id. at 855. 
131 Id. at 857. 
132 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
133 Id. at 309. 
134 E.g., United States v. Hajduk, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1234 (D. Colo. 2005) (holding 
that the closely regulated business exception did not apply to an electroplating company 
regulated under the CWA and observing that the exception does not extend to “general 
purpose environmental law applied to industrial companies”). See generally United States v. 
Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing “[t]hat such [CERCLA access] 
orders must comply with the Fourth Amendment is apparent from Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. 
. . .”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 39 Va. Cir. 353, 358 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (“[R]egarding 
fishing for striped bass, there is no regulatory scheme under Virginia law or regulations 
which would allow the so-called administrative searches exception, permitting warrantless 
inspections or searches of closely regulated industries.”). 
135 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 
(1967)). 
136 Id. at 321 (“A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA 
search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived 
from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of 
industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser 
divisions of the area, would protect an employer’s Fourth Amendment rights.”). Some courts 
considering challenges to warrants issued to enforce the CWA, however, have closely 
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 In Camara v. San Francisco,137 a municipality sought entry to a private 
residence to conduct a warrantless administrative inspection to identify possible 
violations of the housing code; the resident refused entry and was arrested and 
released on bail.138 The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a 
warrant based on probable cause to conduct such administrative inspections, but 
observed that in some circumstances the warrant requirement could be satisfied in 
the context of area code-enforcement inspections, observing that “because the 
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of 
crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”139 
The Court also noted that area code-enforcement inspections “have a long history of 
judicial and public acceptance” and that “it is doubtful that any other canvassing 
technique would achieve acceptable results.”140 The government could thus obtain a 
warrant to enter a residence by showing that “reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect 
to a particular dwelling” and need not “depend upon specific knowledge of the 
condition of the particular dwelling.”141 Standards might include “the passage of 
time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multifamily apartment house), or the 
condition of the entire area.”142 Notably, the Camara standard has been applied to 
evaluate warrants issued in support of administrative searches conducted pursuant 
to environmental statutes.143  
 Additionally, even when courts do not expressly invoke the relaxed Camara 
standard, agency warrant applications are regularly upheld and the showing required 
by courts readily satisfied.144 Many agencies have adopted procedures for 
examined whether the “allegations are sufficient to support a finding that there was probable 
cause to believe the creek fell within the definition of ‘waters of the United States’ . . . .” 
United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *15–22 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 2, 2006). 
137 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
138 Id. at 526–28. The housing code was contained in a city ordinance and provided that 
“employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the 
performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to 
enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any 
duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.” Id. at 526.   
139 Id. at 537. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 538. 
142 Id. 
143 See, e.g., In re Search Warrant, No. MISC.NO.04-00079-MPT, 2004 WL 1368848, 
at *3 (D. Del. 2004) (invoking the Camara standard in upholding a search warrant issued 
pursuant to the CWA). 
144 E.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc. v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720, 724 (S.D. Ind. 1981) 
(upholding two warrants issued under the CAA, observing that allegations in the warrant 
application that the facility had exceeded certain CAA standards were “clearly sufficient on 
their face as a basis for issuance of an administrative inspection warrant,” and concluding 
that “[a] warrant application need not be accompanied by actual documentation of alleged 
past violations . . .”); Adams, supra note 117. But see Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 773–
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conducting administrative searches and the conduct of searches pursuant to these 
procedures is rather routinized.145  
 CERCLA’s access procedures provide an example.146 CERCLA authorizes 
entry to property for “determining the need for response, or choosing or taking any 
response action under this subchapter, or otherwise enforcing the provisions of this 
subchapter.”147 Generally, an agency will request access, which is often 
“voluntarily” granted—the statute authorizes fines of up to $25,000 per day if 
property owners unreasonably deny access.148 Recognizing that “threat of penalties 
of this magnitude could obviously have a chilling effect on the landowner’s exercise 
of his property rights” and that “the right of a landowner to refuse entry to his 
property is clearly one of the civil rights protected by the Constitution,” courts have 
developed standards for evaluating whether a landowner was reasonable in denying 
access and for reviewing the assessment and amount of civil fines.149 The threat of 
substantial fines nonetheless creates a strong incentive for property owners to grant 
access when it is requested. 
 If a property owner declines to provide the EPA with access, the agency can 
seek a judicial warrant, obtain an administrative order of entry, and then proceed to 
federal district court in an enforcement proceeding to obtain compliance with that 
order,150 or it can proceed directly to federal district court to obtain an original court 
77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a warrant was required for an Ohio Environmental 
Protection Agency search of a tractor-trailer parked in a salvage yard and that no probable 
cause existed based on an anonymous phone tip that the tractor-trailer contained hazardous 
substances and had been relocated to avoid inspection and independent observation of 
barrels). 
145 Notably, however, access accompanied by drilling wells and other physical 
occupations associated with entry have been deemed takings in some circumstances. Roger 
D. Schwenke, Regulatory Access to Contaminated Sites: Some New Twists to an Old Tale, 
26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 749, 788–92 (2002) (reviewing cases); see also 
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1375–78 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding installation of 
groundwater monitoring wells gave rise to a taking). 
146 Although CERCLA’s access procedures do not require application for a warrant, 
they do require the agency to obtain a court order, which would likely be deemed the 
“functional equivalent of a warrant” sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 n.23 (1987). 
147 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(1) (2012). For a comprehensive overview of CERCLA site 
access issues, see Schwenke, supra note 145, at 753 (“It would be perhaps an epitome of 
understatement to suggest that this grant of entry authority is quite broad.”). For an example 
of a state statute authorizing access see the access provisions of Michigan’s Environmental 
Response Act. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.20117 (2011). 
148 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B)(ii). 
149 United States v. Taylor, 8 F.3d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir. 1993) (reviewing an assessment 
of civil fines under the Michigan Environmental Response Act); see also United States v. M. 
Genzale Plating, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (evaluating the imposition of fines 
under CERCLA’s access provisions). 
150 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(A) to (B). 
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order enjoining interference with an authorized request for entry.151 Access is 
warranted where the agency has “a reasonable basis to believe there may be a release 
or threat of a release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant,”152 which 
can be “established either by presenting specific evidence relating to the facility to 
be entered or by demonstrating that the entry is part of a neutral administrative 
inspection plan.”153 Access may be granted to properties that are not the site of the 
release,154 including adjoining properties.155 Courts have permitted access by 
nonagency, private entities156 and granted access to residential properties.157 The 
statute instructs that courts should not order access where “under the circumstances 
of the case the demand for entry or inspection is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”158 
 This standard is quite deferential to agencies. However, in United States v. 
Tarkowski,159 the Seventh Circuit found that the EPA abused its discretion, and 
declined to grant the agency an access order, where the EPA sought access to private 
property with little evidence of contamination and the order sought access to conduct 
remediation in addition to access to investigate.160 Tarkowski presented unusual 
facts. The property involved was the primary residence of an elderly man and was 
located in an area that had developed and become more upscale.161 The neighbors 
regarded the property as an eyesore and complained about the property to the EPA, 
and otherwise “harass[ed]” Tarkowski.162 However, although the property was 
cluttered and run down, prior testing had shown no pollution levels of concern.163 
While the Seventh Circuit remarked in its decision that it did “not know whether 
Tarkowski’s angry neighbors exert a malign influence over the local office of the 
151 United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1266–70 (D. 
Mass. 1988). 
152 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B); see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Briar Lake Dev. 
Corp., 736 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that CERCLA’s statutory standard 
displaces the usual equitable standard for obtaining an injunction). 
153 Adams, supra note 117, at 8. 
154 United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The release (actual or 
threatened) need not be on that property; the statute authorizes the EPA to enter any place 
where entry is necessary to determine the need for response or the appropriate response, and 
any place adjacent to such a place.”). 
155 Id.; Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. at 1273–74. 
156 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 93–97 (D. Conn. 1988) (upholding 
access by private party generator who had entered into a consent decree with the EPA to 
implement a remedy under § 9606(a)). 
157 United States v. Mountaineer Refining Co., 886 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Wyo. 1995) 
(granting access under section 104 to “residential property that includes about 40 acres and 
contains [the] family home and garage” that was adjacent to the contaminated site). 
158 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B)(i). 
159 248 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2001). 
160 Id. at 599–600. 
161 Id. at 597–98. 
162 Id. at 598. 
163 Id. 
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EPA,” the court was clearly doubtful that the property presented an environmental 
threat and was suspect of the agency’s motives.164 Additionally, the fact that the EPA 
sought access for both investigation and remediation proved to be important. The 
Seventh Circuit focused on the dangers of authorizing the agency to undertake 
unspecified remedial action165 and expressly noted that it “need not consider 
whether, if only [access for investigative purposes was] sought, the EPA has made 
a sufficient showing to justify such an order.”166 
 The foregoing overview reveals that agencies regularly conduct environment 
surveillance to implement environmental statutes and illustrates how the Fourth 
Amendment applies in that context. Often, this simply entails applying settled 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, although some aspects of the environmental context 
render certain Fourth Amendment doctrines particularly salient. For example, the 
open fields doctrine and the closely regulated business exception are often 
potentially available as a result of the nature of the conduct and entities being 
regulated.   
 Ultimately, however, the Fourth Amendment cases flowing from 
environmental surveillance are not particularly helpful for thinking about privacy 
with respect to environmentally significant behaviors because they overwhelmingly 
involve surveillance of commercial entities as opposed to individuals. This is 
because most statutory environmental law does not apply to individuals.167 Although 
the warrant requirement for administrative searches clearly extends to commercial 
entities, searches of commercial entities and private persons pose distinct privacy 
considerations.168 Thus, privacy vis-à-vis nuisance provides an unsatisfying basis 
for comparison to privacy vis-à-vis environmentally significant individual behavior 
because often actions giving rise to a nuisance do not need to be widely aggregated 
164 Id. at 600. 
165 Id. (“It is unreasonable for the EPA to insist on judicial carte blanche to embark on 
drastic remedial action in advance of obtaining any rational basis for believing that there is 
any danger to the environment that would warrant such action.”). 
166 Id. at 598. 
167 Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1, at 517–18.  
168 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (upholding 
warrantless aerial inspection of a commercial facility under the CAA but distinguishing a 
search of the curtilage of a private home); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1967) 
(“We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in 
many more situations than private homes. . . .”); N.J. Dept. Envtl. Prot. v. Huber, 63 A.3d 
197, 211 (N.J. 2013) (declining to apply the closely regulated industry exception to wetlands 
regulation on residential property, observing that “[t]he factual setting and historical 
perspective to the exception for pervasively or closely regulated businesses noted in Burger 
fail to provide support for a general extrapolation of Burger’s holding permitting a limited 
area of warrantless administrative searches to the more heightened privacy interests that are 
associated with a private, residential property,” and concluding that “Burger arose in a 
commercial business setting and its emphasis on the lesser privacy interest in such settings, 
particularly when highly regulated work is performed, does not encourage Burger’s 
extension outside of the commercial setting of a closely regulated industry” (citing New York 
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693–96, 702 (1987))). 
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to impose environmental harms. And, similarly, most Fourth Amendment 
environmental surveillance cases arising under environmental statutes provide an 
unsatisfying basis for comparison because they involve commercial entities as 
opposed to individuals. There is, however, a subset of Fourth Amendment 
environmental surveillance cases that provide a better basis for insight into privacy 
in environmentally significant individual behaviors because they involve both 
aggregation and individuals—cases involving the application of fish and game laws 
to individuals (or the “hunter enforcement” cases).169   
 
C.  Hunter Enforcement Cases 
 
 Fish and game officers are often conferred broad statutory authority to 
investigate and enforce fish and game laws,170 including entering property,171 
169 This is not to suggest that the hunter enforcement cases provide a perfect analogue. 
Although privacy balancing in the hunter enforcement cases provides a closer analogy to 
privacy balancing with respect to the collection and use of information about 
environmentally significant individual behaviors than nuisance or environmental statutes 
directed to commercial entities, even the hunter enforcement cases present significant 
distinctions. Fish and game stops of hunters to request identification and search a game bag 
intrude on privacy in a qualitatively different way than the generation, storage, and use of 
data about individuals’ everyday behaviors by smart cities. 
170 I use the term “fish and game officers” and “fish and game laws” loosely to 
encompass generally laws governing hunting and fishing and those charged with 
implementing such laws. 
171 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531.13 (2012) (“Any regularly employed salaried 
wildlife officer may enter any private lands or waters if the wildlife officer has good cause 
to believe and does believe that a law is being violated.”); id. § 1531.14 (“Any person 
regularly employed by the division of wildlife for the purpose of conducting research and 
investigation of game or fish or their habitat conditions . . . or in the enforcement of laws or 
division rules relating to game or fish, . . . while in the normal, lawful, and peaceful pursuit 
of such investigation, work, or enforcement may enter upon, cross over, be upon, and remain 
upon privately owned lands for such purposes and shall not be subject to arrest for trespass 
while so engaged or for such cause thereafter.”); see also State v. Coburn, 903 N.E.2d 1204, 
1207 (Ohio 2009) (“This provision [RC 1531.14] is . . . clear and unambiguous; it plainly 
permits wildlife officers to enter upon private land while in the normal, lawful, and peaceful 
pursuit of enforcing laws relating to game and fish.”). 
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conducting various types of searches,172 and operating fish and game checkpoints.173 
There are hundreds of cases examining whether and how the Fourth Amendment 
applies with respect to the enforcement of fish and game laws.174 These cases may 
172 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:10-20, at 565–66 (2006) (“A member of the Fish and 
Game Council and any conservation officer may, without warrant search and examine any 
boat, conveyance, vehicle, fish box, fish basket, game bag, game coat or other receptacle for 
game and fish, when he has reason to believe that a provision of this Title, or any law 
supplementary thereto, or the State Fish and Game Code has been violated . . . . A court, 
upon receiving proof of probable cause for believing in the concealment of a bird, animal or 
fish so unlawfully caught, taken, killed, had in possession or under control, shipped or about 
to be shipped, shall issue a search warrant and cause a search to be made in any place, and 
to that end, may, after demand and refusal, cause any building, inclosure or car to be entered, 
and any apartment, chest, box, locker, crate, basket or package to be broken open and its 
contents examined by a member of the Fish and Game Council or any conservation officer.”); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531.13 (“They may inspect any container or package at any time 
except when within a building and the owner or person in charge of the building objects. The 
inspection shall be only for bag limits of wild animals taken in open season or for wild 
animals taken during the closed season, or for any kind or species of those wild animals. . . . 
A wildlife officer . . . may search any place which the officer has good reason to believe 
contains a wild animal or any part of a wild animal taken or had in possession contrary to 
law . . . . If the owner or person in charge of the place to be searched refuses to permit the 
search, upon filing an affidavit in accordance with law with a court having jurisdiction of the 
offense and upon receiving a search warrant issued, the officer forcibly may search the place 
described . . . .”); see also State v. Putzke, 218 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) 
(upholding warrantless search of fishing boat and observing that “[e]nforcement of the 
Wildlife Laws without a search warrant, where the officer has reason to believe that evidence 
of violation of such laws may be found . . . is consistent with the spirit and purpose of the 
Ohio Wildlife Laws”). But see Washington Cnty. v. Althiser, No. 97CA14, 1998 WL 2514, 
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1998) (“We reiterate our prior warning. A wildlife officer, just 
like any state actor, must have probable cause and either a warrant to search or the situation 
must fit a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”); State v. Hopkins, No. 94 CA 
05, 1995 WL 34786, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1995) (observing that “[w]ildlife officers 
are as much bound by constitutional limits as any other police officer” and equating the “has 
good reason to believe” standard to probable cause). 
173 “[A] roadblock, sometimes called a checkpoint, check station, or the like, is an 
officially required stopping or slowing of the motor vehicles that pass a designated point on 
a road, street, or highway in order to inspect or search the vehicles or to question the drivers 
or other occupants.” Jeffery F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity of Roadblocks by State or Local 
Officials for Purpose of Enforcing Fish or Game Laws, 87 A.L.R. 981, 982 n.1 (1991); e.g., 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1201(b) (2011) (providing statutory authority for fish and game 
checkpoints); State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 315–16 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
fish and game checkpoint and listing cases); State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 427–30 (Or. 
1980) (upholding, under both the state and federal constitutions, a state police roadblock 
designed to enforce game laws); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724–25 (S.D. 1979) 
(upholding stop of vehicles at a checkpoint for the purpose of checking wild game). 
174 Numerous law review articles, primarily student notes, discuss the intersection 
between the Fourth Amendment and hunter enforcement. See generally, e.g., Edwin J. 
Butterfoss & Joseph L. Daly, State v. Colosimo: Minnesota Anglers’ Freedom From 
                                                          
32 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
prove to be particularly helpful for generating insights into privacy vis-à-vis 
environmentally significant individual behaviors because (1) the conduct regulated 
by the fish and game laws is typically of a type that is relatively insignificant in 
isolation (taking a single deer out of season) but potentially harmful when 
aggregated with the conduct of others (wholesale poaching could, for example, 
impact deer populations); (2) these cases usually involve individuals (hunters) as 
opposed to commercial entities; and (3) the Fourth Amendment analysis in these 
cases often involves an express balancing of privacy and state interest.   
 A review of hunter enforcement cases permits a few observations that may be 
helpful for thinking about privacy with respect to environmentally significant 
individual behaviors. In weighing privacy harms against state interest, the fact that 
the hunter’s conduct would require aggregation to produce environmental harm does 
not appear to diminish the weight afforded to the state interest. Indeed, the state 
interest in enforcing fish and game laws is generally recognized to be significant. 
Additionally, the fact that fish and game laws are directed primarily to individuals 
as opposed to commercial entities plays out in an interesting fashion in the Fourth 
Amendment analysis. On the one hand, privacy intrusions are clearly recognized to 
be more significant with respect to individuals, and one mechanism that is employed 
to justify intrusion on hunter privacy is to liken hunters to a regulated business. On 
the other hand, the enforcement challenges presented by applying fish and game 
laws to individuals provide strong rationales for justifying less protective practices 
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, overall, hunter enforcement 
appears to present a context where legislatures and courts balancing privacy and 
enforcement have generally privileged enforcement, suggesting the twin facts—that 
the privacy intrusions accrue to individuals and the conduct being regulated requires 
aggregation to produce significant harm—do not dictate that privacy interests will 
trump (environmental) regulatory interests. 
  
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Becomes “The One That Got Away,” 31 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 527 (2004); Donald C. Douglas, Jr., Comment, A Comment On Louisiana 
Wildlife Agents and Probable Cause: Are Random Game Checks Constitutional?, 53 LA. L. 
REV. 525 (1992); Giffin, supra note 20; Bryan M. Mull, Comment, The Hidden Cost of Rod 
and Rifle: Why State Fish and Game Laws Must Be Amended in Order to Protect Against 
Unreasonable Search and Seizure in the Great Outdoors, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 801 (2013); 
Karie A. Price, State v. Larsen: The Catch of the Day Is a Violation of Your Fourth 
Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 8 GREAT PLAINS 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 78 (2003); Malin J. Stearns, Note, It’s Good to Be the Game Warden: 
State v. Boyer and the Erosion of Privacy Protection for Montana Sportsmen, 65 MONT. L. 
REV. 187 (2004); Scott Witty, It’s a Keeper: Preserving Minnesota’s Recreational Fishing 
by Allowing Effective Regulatory Enforcement, 26 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 151 (2004). 
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1.  Aggregation 
 
 Fourth Amendment analysis can require courts to balance the state interest 
advanced by a challenged practice and the privacy intrusion that it occasions.175 The 
hunter enforcement cases often engage in this type of balancing176 and routinely 
identify a very strong government interest in enforcement of fish and game laws. 
Importantly, the fact that many hunters’ actions must generally be aggregated to 
produce the environmental harm sought to be avoided (depletion of fish and game 
populations) does not appear to diminish the perceived state interest in the hunter 
enforcement cases.  
 The Idaho Supreme Court, in evaluating a game checkpoint under the Fourth 
Amendment, observed that “[t]he State has a compelling interest in the management 
and conservation of its natural resources, including wildlife”; the court looked to the 
broad statutory authority granted to fish and game wardens as a signal of the 
“legislature’s perception that fish and game violations are matters of grave public 
concern which justify minimal intrusion into the public’s right of privacy.”177 En 
route to holding that officers’ warrantless entry to property to enforce hunting law 
was permitted under the open fields doctrine, a New Jersey court reasoned that 
hunting is “a dangerous activity which subjects people and domestic animals to 
possible injury”; the court concluded that “it would appear that there is strong public 
interest in the enforcement of laws pertaining to the regulation and control of the 
taking of wildlife in New Jersey . . . .”178 These cases illustrate a common refrain in 
hunter enforcement cases. As the Supreme Court of North Dakota summarized in a 
175 E.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (“When . . . ‘special needs’—
concerns other than crime detection—are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment 
intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing 
private and public interests advanced by the parties.”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
536–37 (1967) (setting forth a reasonableness balancing test for administrative searches and 
observing that “[u]nfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails”). 
176 E.g., State v. Jackson, 764 So.2d 64, 72 (La. 2000) (observing that “[i]n all cases 
addressing the constitutionality of the checkpoints, the intrusion on the individual’s liberty 
interest has been weighed against the legitimate governmental interest involved”); Jamie 
Esser, The Validity of Warrantless Administrative Searches During Fishing Regulation 
Enforcement, DCBA BRIEF, Feb. 2011, at 34, 39 (reviewing recreational fishing search cases 
and concluding that “[t]he courts in many of the stated cases are balancing the needs of the 
individual against the governmental interest”). Although it can be difficult to discern when 
balancing is appropriate and the Supreme Court’s view has evolved—see generally Fabio 
Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern 
Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1226–34 (2004) (describing balancing in 
application of the special needs test)—for present purposes it is sufficient to note that many 
courts have engaged in such balancing in hunter enforcement cases at different times and in 
different contexts. 
177 State v. Medley, 898 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Idaho 1995) (striking down a fish and game 
checkpoint used as a drag net to identify myriad unrelated violations). 
178 State v. Gates, 703 A.2d 696, 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997). 
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case upholding a fish and game checkpoint, “As precedents elsewhere have 
recognized, the State has a compelling interest in managing and preserving its 
wildlife.”179 This articulation of state interest offered by the California Supreme 
Court in 2011 in upholding a suspicionless vehicle stop by a fish and game officer 
is particularly thorough: 
 
Here, the state interest at issue is the state’s interest in protecting and 
preserving the fish and game resources of the state for the benefit of all 
of the public and for future generations. The legitimacy and importance 
of this state interest are reflected in a number of provisions embodied in 
the California Constitution in numerous statutory provisions and in many 
judicial decisions rendered throughout our state’s history. Past cases have 
described the state interest in preserving and managing its natural 
resources, including its wildlife, as great and compelling and have 
stressed that the state has an obligation and duty to exercise supervision 
over such resources for the benefit of the public generally. Although 
many of the prior California decisions, drawing upon the common law, 
speak of the state’s “title” or “ownership” of the wild fish and animals 
within its borders—a characterization that a number of United States 
Supreme Court decisions have described as a legal fiction—all of the 
pertinent decisions, including all of the federal decisions that have 
addressed the state ownership of wildlife language, confirm the legitimate 
and, indeed, vital nature of a state’s interest in protecting its natural 
resources, including the wildlife within the state, from depletion and 
potential unavailability for future generations.180 
 
 The strength of the identified interest in the enforcement of fish and game laws 
likely arises, in part, from the nature of the government’s relationship to wildlife. 
Both the doctrine of public ownership and public trust doctrine, for example, under 
which governments are understood to own wildlife and/or have the responsibility to 
manage wildlife for the benefit of the public, have been cited in Fourth Amendment 
cases evaluating the government’s interest in enforcing fish and game laws.181 For 
179 State v. Albaugh, 571 N.W.2d 345, 347–48 (N.D. 1997) (citations omitted); see also 
Betchart v. Cal. State Dep’t of Fish &Game, 205 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(observing that “[t]he entries by the wardens are for the purpose of regulating and managing 
a state-owned resource”). 
180 People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 260–61 (Cal. 2011) (citations omitted). 
181 See State v. McHugh, 630 So.2d 1259, 1265–67 (La. 1994) (citing to public trust 
doctrine in upholding “suspicionless [hunting] license check stops”); State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 
771, 776 (Mont. 2002) (“In this capacity, game wardens are acting not only as law 
enforcement officers, but as public trustees protecting and conserving Montana’s wildlife 
and habitat for all of its citizens.”); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724 (S.D. 1979) 
(upholding fish and game checkpoint and weighing the state interest involved, reasoning 
both that “[w]ild animals in this state are the property of the state” and that “[t]he citizens of 
this state have an interest in the management of wildlife so that it can be effectively 
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present purposes, however, what is interesting about the characterization of the 
government interest in the hunter enforcement cases is that the weight afforded to 
the environmental goal does not appear to be diminished by the fact that the actions 
subject to regulation must be aggregated to impose meaningful environmental harm. 
The individuals to whom fish and game laws are applied are, independently, merely 
de minimis contributors; even when they violate fish and game laws, individually 
they impose no appreciable harm to larger conservation goals. Courts did not 
minimize the state interest involved by reasoning that the harm imposed by an 
individual hunter’s violation of the fish and game laws was slight.182 The overall 
conservation benefits of implementing fish and game laws writ large defined the 
state interest. 
 That the need for aggregation does not diminish state interest is true of Fourth 
Amendment analysis in other contexts.183 However, it is especially useful to observe 
that the need for aggregation does not diminish state interest in the hunter 
enforcement cases because, like other environmentally significant individual 
behaviors, these cases involve individuals as contributors to an environmental 
problem.  
 
2.  Individual 
 
 That hunters are a class of regulated individuals, as opposed to commercial 
entities, bears on Fourth Amendment analysis in the hunter enforcement cases in an 
interesting fashion. With respect to evaluating the state interest involved, the 
challenge of enforcing fish and game laws against numerous individuals, 
particularly in light of the often expansive geography of hunting and fishing, 
provides strong arguments that aggressive enforcement measures are necessary for 
fish and game regulation to function effectively. However, the fact that these 
enforcement measures will be directed to individuals, as opposed to commercial 
entities, generally causes (or would typically cause) the ensuing intrusion to be 
conserved.”) (citation omitted); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” 
Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 350 
n.93 (2003) (exploring the legal implications of the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife 
and observing that “the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife also has been invoked to 
justify warrantless searches and seizures in conjunction with the enforcement of wildlife 
laws”); Dale D. Goble, Symposium, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public 
Trust, and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 851 n.219 (2005) (describing how State’s 
public interest in wildlife impacts Fourth Amendment analysis). 
182 Boyer, 42 P.3d at 777 (observing that an angler’s “claim that he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his catch as he enjoyed the peace and tranquility of the Missouri 
River reeks of irony as his peaceful and tranquil poaching threatened the river’s resources 
for future generations”). 
183 William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1016, 1032 (1995) (“The government’s ‘need’ argument in these typical regulatory 
settings is not the need to engage in this particular search. Rather, the relevant government 
interest is the interest in having the regulatory regime.”). 
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weighted more heavily. Courts in hunter enforcement cases, however, particularly 
those approving relaxed Fourth Amendment procedures, have often characterized 
hunters as akin to commercial entities in various respects and reasoned that the 
intrusion is therefore minimized when fish and game laws are applied to hunters. 
 As noted above, the enforcement challenges presented by regulating hunters, in 
large part because they are numerous and geographically dispersed individuals, are 
often referenced as a significant factor in evaluating the need for a particular fish 
and game enforcement practice. The Oregon Supreme Court forcefully made this 
point in State v. Tourtillot,184 where the court cited to the following information in 
upholding warrantless game checkpoint stops: 
 
In 1977, 412,100 hunting licenses were sold in Oregon, which then 
contained about 2.4 million people. Recreational hunting and fishing 
licenses sold in Oregon in 1977 totaled 1,043,158. Over one-half of 
Oregon’s 96,981 square miles is publicly owned. These statistics 
highlight the task which faces game law enforcement personnel in 
carrying out the wildlife policy of this state. The broad expanse of 
territory in Oregon, much of which is virtually uninhabited, makes law 
enforcement difficult. The checkpoint was established on the first 
weekend of hunting season. It was placed on an isolated road where 
hunting activity was to be expected. Thus, the method chosen would be 
one of the most effective ones to meet its goals.185 
 
Courts in many other hunter enforcement cases have been similarly sympathetic to 
the enforcement challenges posed by the regulation of hunters. 186 Indeed, Justice 
Blackmun, in his concurrence in Delaware v. Prouse,187 (which held that roving 
vehicle stops for license and registration checks violate the Fourth Amendment) 
stated, 
 
I would not regard the present case as a precedent that throws any 
constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and 
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the 
performance of their duties. In a situation of that type, it seems to me, the 
184 618 P.2d 423 (Or. 1980). 
185 Id. at 430 (citations omitted). 
186 E.g., People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 262 (Cal. 2011); State v. Gates, 703 A.2d 
696, 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) (“The nature of hunting, involving as it does vast 
expanses of undeveloped land, and the mobility of its participants on foot and by use of motor 
vehicles make it an elusive activity, requiring immediate response when violations of the law 
are suspected.”); State v. Albaugh, 571 N.W.2d 345, 348 (N.D. 1997) (“Game wardens 
surely face a daunting task when attempting to enforce the game laws in a rural region like 
North Dakota. In assessing the need for checkpoints to do so, courts have stressed the limited 
manpower available to game officials, the vast and remote areas where hunting usually 
occurs, and the difficulty in detecting game violations without suspicionless stops.”). 
187 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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Court’s balancing process, and the value factors under consideration, 
would be quite different.188  
 
More generally, the challenges of enforcing broad regulatory schemes are 
recognized as a rationale for relaxing Fourth Amendment requirements in other 
contexts;189 in endorsing area code-enforcement inspections in Camara, for 
example, the Supreme Court recognized that regulatory enforcement realities were 
appropriate to consider in assessing reasonableness.190 Thus, at least for this purpose 
(assessing state interest and need), the fact that hunters constitute a class of difficult-
to-regulate individuals clearly increases tolerance for privacy intrusions. 
 Generally speaking in Fourth Amendment analysis, however, it is clear that 
privacy intrusions experienced by individuals are weighed more heavily than 
intrusions experienced by commercial entities.191 Thus, the intrusions experienced 
by hunters should be weighed more heavily than similar intrusions borne by 
commercial entities in the application of environmental laws directed primarily to 
commercial entities. The hunter enforcement cases underscore the particular concern 
reserved for privacy intrusions experienced by individuals, albeit in a somewhat 
contradictory fashion. Some courts characterize intrusions experienced by hunters 
as intrusions experienced by individuals and value the intrusions accordingly. Other 
courts distinguish hunters, as a class, from individuals writ large and on that basis 
diminish the intrusions experienced by hunters.192 
188 Id. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
189 Arcila, supra note 176, at 1240 (“[I]t is clear that we have moved from a limited 
government with a commensurately limited civil search power, to an expansive government 
whose effectiveness calls for a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that accommodates 
suspicionless civil searches.”). 
190 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535−36 (1967) (reasoning that “[i]n 
determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable—and thus in determining whether 
there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection—the need for the inspection 
must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement,” and observing 
that “[t]here is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only 
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by 
municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures”). 
191 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (“We find it 
important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy 
expectations are most heightened.”); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981) (“The 
greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact 
that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property 
differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this privacy 
interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes 
authorizing warrantless inspections.”); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1967) 
(“We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in 
many more situations than private homes . . . .”). 
192 In one interesting case, the Ninth Circuit held that a stop undertaken by a roving 
patrol that was stopping all vehicles in a national park to check for possible game violations 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court assessed the expectation of privacy not of hunters, 
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 In State v. Larsen,193 the Supreme Court of Minnesota declined to extend the 
closely regulated business exception to a game warden’s search of a fish house.194 
The court viewed that line of cases as extending to “industries” in a “narrow field of 
commercial activity” where enforcement of the regulation at issue involved “serious 
personal safety concerns or felony level criminal conduct.”195 The court found that 
the fishing regulations were “no more pervasive or comprehensive than the state’s 
traffic rules and regulations” and that traffic stops require reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a stop.196 
 The court in Tallman v. Department of Natural Resources197 similarly drew a 
sharp distinction between industry and individuals with respect to invocation of the 
closely regulated business exception.198 Tallman upheld a warrantless search of a 
commercial fishing vessel pursuant to a Michigan law governing commercial 
fishing.199 In doing so, the Tallman court drew a distinction between commercial 
and recreational entities.200 In a prior case, State Conservation Department v. 
Seaman,201 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the warrantless search and seizure 
of a moored vessel conducted under the state’s fish and game laws, authorizing 
warrantless searches based on probable cause to believe that a violation of the state’s 
fish and game laws had occurred, violated the Fourth Amendment.202 Distinguishing 
its case from Seaman, the Tallman court noted, 
 
Seaman authorized searches for the purpose of enforcing regulations 
regarding wild animals, wild birds, and fish against commercial and 
recreational violators alike. The statute at issue in the cases presently 
before the Court . . . applies only to those licensed by the state to harvest 
the state’s fishery resources for personal profit. The fact that the statute 
at issue here is exclusively applicable to commercial fishers is especially 
relevant, because the DNR has raised a question of first impression not 
touched upon in Seaman or in any other decision of this Court: the legality 
but of individuals who visit national parks and expressly declined to apply the closely 
regulated business exception, observing that “Congress established national parks in part to 
preserve for people a setting for respite and reflection” such that “federal regulations 
governing the use and management of the parks . . .” do not diminish expectations of privacy 
in those visiting national parks. United States v. Munoz, 701 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1983). 
193 650 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. 2002). 
194 Id. at 153. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 365 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. 1984). 
198 Id. at 726. 
199 Id. at 746. 
200 Id. 
201 240 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 1976). 
202 Id. at 213. 
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of a warrantless search of commercial premises for the purpose of 
enforcing a pervasive regulatory scheme.203 
 
Later in its decision, the Tallman court again emphasized that the holding adopting 
and applying the closely regulated business exception was limited to commercial 
fishermen. Distinguishing a prior case that had struck down a requirement that 
persons hunting, fishing, or trapping allow conservation officers to “inspect, count, 
and examine” all wildlife, hunting, or fishing equipment in their possession as 
violating the search and seizure provision of Michigan’s Constitution, the Tallman 
court noted, 
 
That case [People ex rel. Attorney General v. Lansing Municipal 
Judge]204 might prove apposite to the cases presently before this Court, 
but for the crucial fact that the party accused of violating the state’s 
conservation laws in that case took the state’s wildlife for pleasure rather 
than for profit. Because we deal here with parties engaged in a 
pervasively regulated commercial endeavor, Lansing Municipal Judge is 
inapposite. We do not pass here on the question whether the DNR may 
make warrantless searches, absent probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, of the persons or property of recreational fishers for the 
purpose of enforcing regulations which limit their activities.205 
 
 In other hunter enforcement cases, courts have either expressly applied the 
closely regulated business exception to hunters206 or employed rationales similar to 
those used to justify the closely regulated business exception (consent, privilege, and 
notice) to characterize hunters as having lower expectations of privacy in the 
relevant context. In Betchart v. California State Department of Fish and Game,207 
for example, a California state court relied on the closely regulated business 
exception in upholding warrantless entry by Fish and Game personnel on private 
property where game is present to enforce wild game regulations.208 The court found 
that the property in question was agricultural and, under federal law, was an open 
field to which the property owner did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 209 However, the plaintiff based his claim on the warrant requirement of the 
203 Tallman, 365 N.W.2d at 741. 
204 42 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1950). 
205 Tallman, 365 N.W.2d at 741. 
206 In addition to the discussed cases, see, for example, Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d 
520, 532 (6th Cir. 2002), finding that “[e]veryone who participates in the privilege of hunting 
has a duty to permit inspections to determine whether they are complying with applicable 
laws. Hunting and fishing are regulated activities under both state and federal law. The 
Supreme Court has found that a warrantless search of a regulated industry or business is 
reasonable.” Id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)). 
207 205 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
208 Id. at 137–39. 
209 Id. at 137. 
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California Constitution, which applies a balancing test to open fields—whether a 
person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that 
expectation has been violated by unreasonable governmental intrusion.210 The court 
reasoned that “[t]he fact that Biswell dealt with a business is not the sole factor to be 
considered” and observed that—by analogizing hunters to closely regulated 
businesses—“[h]unters are required to be licensed,” and “[b]y choosing to engage 
in this highly regulated activity, there is a fundamental premise that there is an 
implied consent to effective supervision and inspection as directed by statute.”211 
 Similarly, in People v. Maikho,212 the California Supreme Court reasoned that 
“the intrusion upon privacy engendered by a game warden’s stop of an angler or 
hunter to demand the display of his or her catch or take is relatively minor,” in part 
because hunters “have voluntarily chosen to engage in an activity that is heavily 
regulated in order to assure the continued existence of the wildlife of this state for 
the benefit not only of future generations but for the benefit of current anglers and 
hunters themselves.”213 The court went on to reject the idea that the rationales for 
the closely regulated business exception might not apply to hunters as individuals, 
commenting that “[c]ontrary to defendant’s contention, numerous cases establish 
that the existence of pervasive regulation can diminish the reasonable expectation of 
individuals as well as businesses.”214 
 Still, in other hunter enforcement cases, while not relying expressly upon the 
closely regulated business exception, courts have endeavored to distinguish hunters 
as a class from the public writ large, citing to factors such as consent, privilege, and 
notice or knowledge. In State v. Boyer,215 for example, the Supreme Court of 
Montana held that a game warden’s request for inspection of catch was not a search 
because the fisherman had no expectation of privacy that society was prepared to 
honor in the fishing catch contained in a closed live well.216 The court found that 
anglers were on notice of the inspection requirements (“[i]n complying with the well 
established license requirements, anglers acknowledge the prospect of at least some 
governmental intrusion into their activities”) and that by “engaging in this highly 
regulated activity, anglers must assume the burdens of the sport as well as its 
benefits.”217 In People v. Layton,218 an Illinois appellate court upheld the warrantless 
search of a hunter’s game bag and held that “probable cause to search[] arises from 
indicia that the person in question is a hunter, immediately or very recently engaged 
in hunting.”219 The court rejected application of the exigent circumstances or closely 
regulated business exceptions on the grounds that the present search was not an 
210 Id. at 136–37. 
211 Id. at 138. 
212 253 P.3d 247 (Cal. 2011). 
213 Id. at 262. 
214 Id. at 262 n.14. 
215 42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002). 
216 Id. at 776. 
217 Id. 
218 552 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
219 Id. at 1287. 
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administrative search.220 The court instead reasoned that hunting “is a privilege, not 
a right” and is “highly regulated” such that hunters “may be deemed [to] consent to 
some intrusions”; the court ultimately characterized hunting as “an exception 
because of necessity.”221 Other courts have offered similar rationales for 
distinguishing hunters as a class.222 
 
3.  Balancing  
 
 Regardless of the specific rationales employed, the hunter enforcement cases 
as a whole reveal that, overall, both the statutory grants of authority to fish and game 
officers and the scrutiny of the actions of fish and game officers implementing those 
statutes under the Fourth Amendment tend to strike a balance between enforcement 
and privacy that favors enforcement. Fish and game checkpoints are regularly 
upheld;223 suspicionless stops have likewise occasionally received court approval.224 
As described by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in a case upholding a warden’s 
suspicionless stop of an ATV rider, “We, along with courts in other states, have also 
recognized the limitations of the Fourth Amendment’s reach regarding wardens and 
other officers whose duties include patrolling and protecting vast territories, such as 
waterways and wooded areas.”225 One commentator observed that “[s]tate statutes 
granting to wildlife officers the authority to make warrantless searches have usually 
220 Id. at 1286–87. 
221 Id. at 1287. 
222 See also, e.g., Elzey v. State, 519 S.E.2d 751, 754 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
game wardens’ approach and questioning of hunters that revealed drugs in part because “the 
peculiar nature of hunting leads to a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of 
hunters”); State v. McHugh, 630 So.2d 1259, 1266 (La. 1994) (“[H]unters entering game 
habitats during open seasons are not taken by surprise because they know or should know of 
their exposure to license and game checks.”); State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 
2003) (“Recreational fishing is a highly regulated and licensed privilege. Those who choose 
to apply for this privilege accept the conditions imposed, unique to the sport of game 
fishing.”). 
223 E.g., United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding 
checkpoint instituted by park rangers to detect illegal poaching); State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 
309, 315 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (upholding fish and game checkpoint and listing cases); State 
v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 430 (Or. 1980) (upholding, under both the state and federal 
constitutions, a state police roadblock designed to enforce game laws); State v. Halverson, 
277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979) (upholding stop of vehicles at a checkpoint for the purpose of 
checking wild game). 
224 People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 263 (Cal. 2011) (holding that it does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment when a game warden, without reasonable suspicion that a fish and 
game regulation has been violated, stops a vehicle whose occupant is or has recently been 
fishing or hunting to demand the occupant display all fish or game taken; observing that “the 
great majority of out-of-state decisions that have addressed the question of the validity of 
suspicionless stops of anglers and hunters by game wardens have found such stops 
constitutionally permissible”; and listing cases). 
225 State v. McKeen, 977 A.2d 382, 386 (Me. 2009). 
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been upheld, whether they permitted warrantless searches by patrolling officers, at 
fixed checkpoints, or business premises of commercial enterprises.”226 Another 
commentator criticized courts’ willingness to authorize game violation inspections, 
observing that “allowing game wardens to make random stops would give rise to the 
‘grave danger of abuse of discretion’ about which the Court in Prouse was rightly 
concerned . . . .”227 As noted above, the Supreme Court characterized the 
implementation of fish and game law as an area appropriately afforded special 
solicitude in Fourth Amendment analysis when Justice Blackmun referred in his 
concurrence in Delaware v. Prouse to “the necessarily somewhat individualized and 
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the performance of their 
duties.”228 In 2000, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, en route to adopting a new 
standard for evaluating checkpoints, lamented that its precedents (upholding hunting 
license checkpoints but not checkpoints directed to drunk driving) “create the 
anomaly that preservation of the state's wildlife is a more compelling governmental 
interest than the protection of human life from drunken drivers on our public 
roadways.”229 Although the Supreme Court of Louisiana went on to rectify the 
“anomaly” by adopting a new standard for evaluating checkpoints, the fact that the 
anomaly existed at all attests to the solicitude afforded to fish and game enforcement. 
 This should not be taken to suggest that courts do not use the Fourth 
Amendment to limit fish and game enforcement authority; there are numerous 
examples of courts construing fish and game statutes narrowly to avoid 
constitutional problems, striking down those statutes as inconsistent with Fourth 
Amendment requirements or holding more narrowly that a particular search or 
seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.230 Overall, however, legislatures and 
courts, while recognizing privacy concerns, have tended to strike a balance relatively 
favorable to regulation in the hunter enforcement context. 
226 Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Wildlife 
Possession Laws, 50 A.L.R. 724, 728 (1997) (citations omitted). 
227 LAFAVE, supra note 114, § 10.8(e). 
228 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
229 State v. Jackson, 764 So.2d 64, 69 (La. 2000). 
230 E.g., State v. Legg, 536 S.E.2d 110, 116 (W.Va. 2000) (suppressing evidence 
obtained during conservation officers’ random stop to conduct game-kills survey and holding 
that officer must have articulable reasonable suspicion of offense to constitutionally stop 
vehicle to conduct game-kill survey); People v. Coca, 829 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo. 1992) (en 
banc) (suppressing evidence obtained during investigatory stop by wildlife officer); Amison 
v. State, 5 So.3d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (interpreting conservation statutes to 
require reasonable suspicion for vehicle stops); Commonwealth v. Ickes, 873 A.2d 698, 703 
(Pa. 2005) (striking down Pennsylvania statute authorizing game officers to stop and demand 
identification and observing that “[n]one of these threshold requirements [reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause, Miranda warnings] are enumerated in the statute that authorizes 
Game Officers to stop and search, but they are required if officers are to avoid constitutional 
impropriety”); People v. Hedges, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012–13 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 1982) 
(holding that statutes authorizing warrantless search of business premises based on “cause to 
believe” that there was a violation of the Environmental Conservation Law were 
unconstitutional); Gilsinger, supra note 226, at 793–94, 797, 804–07.  
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this Article is not to anticipate whether or how the Fourth 
Amendment might apply to specific efforts to collect information about 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. The purpose is to discern the 
considerations that have proven salient in balancing environmental regulation and 
privacy to date that may likewise be relevant to navigating privacy concerns that 
arise with respect to policy directed to environmentally significant individual 
behaviors. 
In this regard, the Article’s survey suggests that neither the fact that 
environmentally significant individual behaviors must be aggregated to produce 
environmental harm nor the fact that individuals, as opposed to commercial entities, 
experience the privacy intrusions involved dictates that privacy concerns will 
override the needs of regulation. As evidenced by nuisance law, that individuals 
impose an environmental externality can be a strong basis for minimizing privacy 
interests. As evidenced by the hunter enforcement cases, even where aggregation is 
required and individuals are the subject of regulation, privacy balancing can favor 
regulation. Notably, however, the articulation of state interest in the hunter 
enforcement cases is clear and strong. Those contemplating, crafting, and 
implementing policies addressed to environmentally significant individual 
behaviors should take care to articulate the strongest case possible that the 
information sought furthers an important state interest. Privacy concerns need not 
derail the development of sophisticated policies aimed at reducing harms arising 
from environmentally significant individual behaviors, but a concerted effort will be 
required to demonstrate the environmental value of limiting harms from 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. A concerted effort will also be 
required to demonstrate that information about environmentally significant 
individual behaviors is important to effect policies directed to those behaviors and 
that privacy balancing should therefore favor disclosure to enable regulation. 
